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Faucette: Your Secret's Safe with Me…or So You Think: How States Have Cash

YOUR SECRET’S SAFE WITH ME . . . OR SO
YOU THINK: HOW THE STATES HAVE
CASHED IN ON BRANZBURG’S “BLANK
CHECK”
I. INTRODUCTION
Reporter’s shield laws are statutes that protect a newsgatherer from
compulsory disclosure of confidential information.1 Since the 1970s,
thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have enacted reporter’s
shield laws.2 During this wave of legislation, states adopted different
types of reporter’s shield laws, each offering varying degrees of
protection to journalists.3 This Note explores these assorted approaches
and examines which type of privilege reporter’s shield laws should give
to a newsgatherer to resist compulsory disclosure of his confidential
sources and information. Consider the following scenario.4
It is three days before Christmas. You come home from work and
your two children greet you at the door. You look at them and see the
excitement of the approaching visit from Old Saint Nick. Then, at that
very moment, you feel your heart rate quicken and your eyes well up
with tears. This sickening feeling comes from the knowledge that in a
few moments you will have to ruin your children’s Christmas. You must
tell them that you will not be able to spend the holidays with them this
year because a federal judge has sentenced you to serve eighteen months
in prison for refusing to disclose the identity of your confidential sources
and information.5 Unfortunately, in 2006, this is how San Francisco
1
Theodore Campagnolo, The Conflict Between State Press Shield Laws and Federal Criminal
Proceedings: The Rule 501 Blues, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 445, 446–47, 451–52 (2002/2003)
(explaining that a journalist’s confidential information often includes the identity of
confidential sources, the information gained from confidential sources, and the journalist’s
own work product). Further, the term “reporter’s privilege” is also known as a
“journalist’s privilege,” a “reportorial privilege,” or a “newsmen’s privilege.” Id. at 447 n.3.
2
Anthony L. Fargo, Analyzing Federal Shield Law Proposals: What Congress Can Learn
from the States, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 35, 46–49 (2006) (discussing shield laws at the state
level and how they developed from the common law). See infra note 31 (outlining the
jurisdictions that have adopted reporter’s shield laws and recent developments at the state
level).
3
See generally Reporter’s Privilege, 919 PLI/Pat 9, 69–480 (Nov. 2007) (extensively
detailing the extent of the split among state and federal jurisdictions as to the scope of
protection of newsgatherers through either the common law or reporter’s shield laws).
4
This anecdote was modified from Professor RonNell Andersen Jones’s law review
article, Avalanche or Undue Alarm? An Empirical Study of Subpoenas Received by the News
Media, 93 MINN. L. REV. 585, 585 (2008).
5
See Bob Egelko, Silence Means Prison, Judge Tells Reporters, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 2006,
at A1 (detailing Fainaru-Wada’s ordeal and prison sentence). See generally In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas, Fairanu-Wada &Williams, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1113–14 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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Chronicle reporter Mark Fainaru-Wada and his family spent the holiday
season.6
The fate of Mark Fainaru-Wada is one he shares with countless other
journalists.7 For centuries judges have held reporters in contempt and
thrown them in jail for refusing to reveal confidential sources and
information.8 The practice of jailing journalists for resisting compulsory
disclosure is traceable to seventeenth century England and appeared in
the American colonies as early as the 1700s.9 In the past three decades,
however, the effort to protect newsgatherers from compulsory disclosure
and incarceration has been the subject of legislative proposals and court
decisions.10 Until now, protection for newsgatherers has been steady,
but it has occurred only at the state level through the enactment of
reporter’s shield laws by state legislatures.11 Reporter’s shield laws offer
journalists a safe-haven and grant them a privilege to resist compliance
with a subpoena or a court order requiring him to testify about his

Mark Fainaru-Wada and his partner at the San Francisco Chronicle, Lance Williams,
refused to comply with federal grand jury subpoenas ordering them to testify about
information they had gained concerning the use of steroids by professional athletes. Id.
The Court denied Fainaru-Wada and Williams’s motion to quash the subpoenas because
compliance with the subpoenas was not unreasonable and ordered them to testify before a
grand jury. See id. at 1121–22. See also Joe Garofoli, 2 Chronicle Reporters at Center of Media,
Government Standoff, S.F. CHRON., Sept 20, 2006, at A1.
6
See Egelko, supra note 5, at A1.
7
See Jones, supra note 4, at 626 (stating that in 2006, a national survey of 761 news and
media organizations reported their newsgatherers had received over three thousand
subpoenas).
8
See 23 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5426 (2008).
9
See, e.g., id. (discussing the practice of Seventeenth Century English courts pertaining
to when a reporter refused to reveal confidential information to a judge on the King’s
Bench and the typical result being a short period of incarceration). See also Linda L. Berger,
Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to Protect the Journalist’s Privilege in an
Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1371, 1384 (2003) (discussing the jailing of
reporters in post-revolutionary America, including Benjamin Franklin’s brother, James
Franklin, and John Peter Zenger).
10
See Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal
Limiting the Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for Sources
and Information, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 107–11 (2002) (giving an overview of the
increased awareness and litigation concerning reporter’s shield laws since the early 1970s).
For further discussion see infra Part II.A (outlining the history of reporter’s shield laws,
how they have developed among the states, and the public policies supporting reporter’s
shield laws).
11
See 2 ANDREW B. ULMER, MEDIA, ADVERTISING, & ENTERTAINMENT LAW THROUGHOUT
THE WORLD § 37:3 (Westlaw 2009), available on Westlaw at MEDIAWORLD § 37:3 (noting
that the states, not the federal government, have been the catalyst for developing and
reforming statutory schemes that safeguard journalists); Alexander, supra note 10, at 107–
11.
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confidential sources and information.12 This Note focuses on the various
types of privileges that state legislatures grant to newsgatherers through
reporter’s shield laws and determines which privilege is the most
effective.13
To date, nearly forty jurisdictions in the United States have adopted
reporter’s shield laws.14 None of these shield laws are the same,
however, and states are not in agreement as to what type of privilege
newsgatherers need to be able to best resist compulsory disclosure.15
Nevertheless, each state’s privilege can be classified into one of four
general categories: (i) an absolute privilege; (ii) a qualified privilege; (iii)
a blended privilege; or (iv) immunity from contempt.16 This Note
addresses the various state approaches and proposes a resolution.17
Part II of this Note explains the composition of a reporter’s shield
law and discusses the root of the current state split: the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Branzburg v. Hayes.18 Further, Part II describes and
illustrates the four types of privileges incorporated into reporter’s shield
laws and examines the public policy considerations supporting each type
of legislation.19 Next, Part III of this Note conducts a cost-benefit
analysis of each of the four privileges to determine which privilege is the
most effective.20
Finally, Part IV of this Note contributes “The
See 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 526 (2004) (explaining what a reporter’s shield law is
and how it functions as a device to guard against compulsory disclosure).
13
See infra Parts II–III (giving background information on reporter’s shield laws and the
types of privileges incorporated into reporter’s shield laws and conducting a cost-benefit
analysis to ascertain which of these privileges is the most practical and effective).
14
See Fargo, Analyzing Federal Shield Law Proposals: What Congress Can Learn from the
States, supra note 2, at 46–49. See also infra note 31 (listing the states that have enacted a
reporter’s shield law and giving the citations to the corresponding state statutes).
15
See Laurence B. Alexander & Ellen M. Bush, Shield Laws on Trial: State Court
Interpretation of the Journalist’s Statutory Privilege, 23 J. LEGIS. 215, 216–18 (1997). See infra
Part II.C (examining the split among the states in further detail).
16
See Anthony L. Fargo & Paul McAdoo, Common Law or Shield Law? How Rule 501
Could Solve the Journalist’s Privilege Problem, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1347, 1355–65 (2007)
(explaining the privileges adopted by reporter’s shield laws and the privileges the state and
federal judicial systems have developed through the common law). See infra Part II.C
(defining the privileges and illustrating how they apply).
17
See infra Parts II–IV (discussing reporter’s shield laws and the different privileges
incorporated by the states, conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the privileges, and
proposing a model statute to resolve the state split).
18
408 U.S. 665 (1972). See infra Parts II.A–B (defining what a reporter’s shield law is,
examining the policies that justify reporter’s shield laws, and discussing the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Branzburg).
19
See infra Part II.C (discussing the differences between each privilege and using the
reporter’s shield laws of Indiana, Florida, Illinois, New York, the District of Columbia, and
California to illustrate the application of each privilege).
20
See infra Part III (examining the costs and benefits of the application of each privilege,
the interests of the parties concerned, and the public policies underlying each privilege).
12
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Newsgatherer’s Protection Act,” which is a model reporter’s shield law
that incorporates what the cost-benefit analysis determines is the most
practical privilege: the blended privilege.21
II. BACKGROUND: THE NUISANCE OF CHOICE
The state split this Note addresses is the product of a single catalyst:
unfettered choice.22 Part II of this Note offers an introduction to state
reporter’s shield laws and explains what reporter’s shield laws are, traces
their development, and explores the purposes and policies they serve.23
Next, Part II discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in Branzburg and
identifies this decision as the source of the current state split.24 Finally,
Part II addresses the problem at the state level and provides examples of
the privileges that state shield laws grant to reporters to resist
compulsory disclosure.25
A. State Reporter’s Shield Laws: An Introduction
First, this Section answers the question, “What is a reporter’s shield
law?”26
Next, it describes the underlying purposes and policy
considerations of state shield laws.27 Additionally, this Section addresses
why shield laws are needed to protect newsgatherers.28
Reporter’s shield laws protect members of the media by granting
newsgatherers a privilege to refuse to reveal confidential sources and

See infra Part IV (offering a model statute with full commentary to resolve the state
split as to which privilege is the most effective and practical).
22
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706 (stating that the states are free to enact any kind of law
granting journalists a privilege to resist compulsory disclosure, so long as the law falls
within the limits of the Constitution). See also Part II.B (explaining that the Branzburg
decision is the root of the state split addressed by this Note).
23
See infra Part II.A (discussing the development of state reporter’s shield laws, how and
why they operate, and the controversy they spark).
24
See infra Part II.B (reviewing the holding, opinions, and reasoning of the Court, and
outlining the principles of the decision).
25
See infra Part II.C (summarizing where the states agree with respect to reporter’s
shield laws and then charting the various privileges incorporated by the states using as
models the shield laws of Indiana, Florida, Illinois, New York, California, and the District
of Columbia).
26
See infra notes 29–31 and accompanying text (explaining that a reporter’s shield law is
a statutory privilege granted to newsgatherers to refuse to comply with court orders or
subpoenas to testify about or reveal confidential sources or information).
27
See infra notes 32–35 and accompanying text (focusing on the policy rationales and
underlying purposes of reporter’s shield laws).
28
See infra, notes 36–40 and accompanying text (discussing the need for reporter’s shield
laws due to the tension that exists between the press, sources of information, litigants, the
government, law enforcement, and the courts).
21
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information when subpoenaed or ordered by a court to do so.29 There is
no uniformly accepted privilege at the state level; rather, states have
implemented a variety of privileges that come in one of four generic
forms: (i) an absolute privilege; (ii) a qualified privilege; (iii) a blended
privilege that combines the absolute and qualified privileges; or (iv)
immunity from contempt for noncompliance with a court order or
subpoena.30 Currently, thirty-five states and the District of Columbia
have enacted reporter’s shield laws and several more have recently
proposed legislation.31
29
See 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 526 (2004) (giving a brief definition of what a reporter’s
shield law is and the effect shield laws have on journalists); ULMER, supra note 11, at § 37:3
(defining reporter’s shield laws and the common law reporter’s privilege and comparing
the two).
30
See Noah Goldstein, An International Assessment of Journalist Privileges and Source
Confidentiality, 14 NEW ENG. INT’L COMP. L. ANN. 103, 110 (2007) (“the various state statutes
range in scope, from broad protections that provide an absolute journalistic privilege, to
shield laws that offer a qualified privilege,” to those that offer everything in between). See
also infra Part II.C (exploring the four generic types of privileges that the states grant
members of the media to be free from compelled disclosure).
31
See ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300–09.25.390 (1992); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982) & ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2214 (1993); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-85-510 (West 1987); CAL. CONST. ART. 1, § 2 (1993); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West
1993); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1986.1 (West 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-119 &
COLO. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-72.5-101 to 24-72.5-106 (West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146T
(2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1992); D.C. CODE §§ 16-4701–16-4704 (1992);
FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (West 1993); 2008 HAW. SESS. LAWS ch.
240 § 1 (effective July 2, 2008); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901 (West 1985); IND. CODE § 34-464-1, 34-46-4-2 (1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (West 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 45:1451–45:1459 (West 1992); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (West 1992); ME.
PUB. L. CH. 654, signed into law on April 18, 2008; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.5A (1982); MINN.
STAT. §§ 595.021–595.025 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901–26-1-903 (1992); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 20-144–20-147 (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 49.275–49.385 (1986); N.J. REV. STAT.
§§ 2A:84A-21–2A:84A-21.13 (1996); N.M. STAT. § 38-6-7 (1987); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H
(McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1991);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04 & 2739.11–2739.12 (West 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506
(1996); OR. REV. STAT., §§ 44.510–44.540 (1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942 (1993); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.1-3 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 24-1-208 (1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.68.010 (2007).
The states that have enacted reporter’s shield laws are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, The District of Columbia, Florida,
Hawaii, Georgia, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Maine,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Washington. For a breakdown of the privileges to which the states
adhere see infra notes 67–70. In addition, several states without reporter’s shield laws have
recently considered legislation to enact a shield law. Several states have bills before their
legislatures, including Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See
S.R. 211, 2009 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009); H.R. 1672, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2008); H.R. 1539, 2008
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 2735, 2008 Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2008); S.R. 235, 2008 Reg. Sess.
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Reporter’s shield laws address several public policy concerns.32
First, reporter’s shield laws facilitate the free flow of information to the
public and promote freedom of the press.33 Next, shield laws aid law
enforcement and litigants where necessary, and prevent the disclosure of
information that is contrary to the public interest.34 Moreover, shield
laws prevent “fishing expeditions” by litigants and government officials
(Wis. 2008). Also, a bill proposing a shield law was actually passed by the Texas State
Senate before being rejected by the State House of Representatives. See S.B. 966, 2008 Reg.
Sess. (Tex. 2008). Finally, Utah’s Supreme Court recently handed down a model
evidentiary rule that would create a shield law. See UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 509,
PROPOSED (2008). See also Media Law Resource Center, Proposed State Shield Law Bills,
http://www.medialaw.org/Template.cfm?Section=Proposed_State_Shield_Law_Bills (last
visited August 3, 2009).
32
Susan M. Gilles, The Image of “Good Journalism” in Privilege, Tort Law, and Constitutional
Law, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 485, 486–90 (2006). Curiously, however, nearly all reporter’s
shield laws are silent as to any kind of legislative intent or purpose. Id. at 487 n.12 (citing
Fargo, Analyzing Federal Shield Law Proposals: What Congress Can Learn from the States, supra
note 2, at 69–70). In fact, the only legislatures to include a statement of legislative purpose
in their reporter’s shield law are Minnesota and Nebraska. Id.
33
See Joel G. Weinberg, Supporting the First Amendment: A National Reporter’s Shield Law,
31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 149, 175 (2006) (noting that enacting a shield law serves two
purposes: assuring the free flow of information to the public and that journalists are free to
report that information, and preventing disclosure of confidential information that is not in
the public’s best interest); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s
Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 535 (2007) (explaining the purpose of shield laws is to
preserve the dissemination of information into the public discourse); Anthony L. Fargo, The
Year of Leaking Dangerously: Shadowy Sources, Jailed Journalists, and the Uncertain Future of the
Federal Journalist’s Privilege, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1063, 1072–73 (2006) (same); Leslye
DeRoos Rood & Ann K. Grossman, The Case for a Federal Journalist’s Testimonial Shield
Statute, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 779, 781 (1991) (the primary objective of a shield law is to
strengthen a reporter’s First Amendment rights).
34
See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696–97, 700 (1972) (discussing the
important need for law enforcement officers to have access to all available information
related to crimes or criminal investigations); Campagnolo, supra note 1, at 451–52
(explaining that shield laws serve to prevent the so-called “chilling effect,” which refers to
the theory that if source confidentiality was not protected then confidential sources would
be reluctant to give information to journalists; hence, the newsgathering process and the
dissemination of information would be “chilled”); Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and
Fourth Estate Inmates: The Misguided Pursuit of a Reporter’s Privilege, 24 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L. J. 385, 428–37 (2006) (suggesting that certain journalists who operate independently
and are not connected with an official news or media organization often are able to obtain
sensitive information relating to criminal investigations and national security); John T.
White, Comment, Smoke Screen: Are State Shield Laws Really Protecting Speech or Simply
Providing Cover for Criminals Like the Serial Arsonist?, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 909, 911–12 (2001)
(describing how reporter’s shield laws aid, but also hinder police investigations). But see
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693–94 (downplaying the plausibility of the “chilling effect” as being
too speculative because only twenty percent of reporters who relied on confidential sources
forecasted any kind of possible adverse effect if their sources were to be disclosed). For an
analysis of the chilling effect and how it influences the type of privilege a state adopts, see
infra Part III.
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who attempt to obtain a journalist’s confidential information for their
own use, which allows a reporter’s communications and relationships
with their sources to remain privileged and confidential.35
Generally, the objectives of the media and the newsgathering
community are to gather information and to relay that information to the
public.36
To accomplish these goals, journalists must often use
confidential sources—sources of information that have a confidentiality
agreement with a reporter—because these sources have access to
sensitive facts and materials.37 Further, information gained from a
35
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 744 n.34 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (recognizing the threat
fishing expeditions pose to a journalist’s ability to maintain the confidentiality of sources
and information). See also Edward L. Carter, Note, Reporter’s Privilege in Utah, 18 BYU J.
PUB. L. 163, 183 (2003) (citing Theodore J. Boutrous & Seth M.M. Stodder, Retooling the
Federal Common-Law Reporter’s Privilege, 17 COMM. LAW. 1, 23 (Spring 1999)) (stating that a
reporter’s shield law eliminates unnecessary subpoenas served upon newsgatherers by
litigants that are on fishing expeditions); Sharon K. Malheiro, Note, The Journalist’s
Reportorial Privilege—What Does it Protect and What are its Limits?, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 79, 90–
91 (1988/1989) (citing Grand Forks Herald v. District Court, 322 N.W.2d 850, 856 (N.D.
1982)) (arguing that the protections of a shield law should prevail over fishing expeditions
into a journalist’s files); Shelley R. Halber, Note, Knight-Ridder Broadcasting v. Greenberg:
is the Judiciary Making Policy?, 8 PACE L. REV. 427, 455–56 n.169 (citing People v. Iannaccone,
447 N.Y.S.2d 996, 997 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982)) (clarifying that the clear language of New York’s
shield law indicated the legislature intended to prevent fishing expeditions); Developments
in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1601 (1985) (stating that
compulsory disclosure inhibits confidential communications between journalists and their
sources). See also MAURICE VAN GERPEN, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND THE PRESS: THE
CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO KNOW VERSUS THE LAW’S RIGHT TO CONFIDENTIAL NEWS SOURCE
EVIDENCE 58–103 (1979) (arguing that a reporter’s privilege is similar to other privileges,
such as the attorney/client, pastor/parishioner, and doctor/patient, but operates in a
different manner because the information is usually known but the source’s identity is not).
36
Robert T. Sherwin, Comment, “Source” of Protection: The Status of the Reporter’s
Privilege in Texas and a Call to Arms for the State’s Legislators and Journalists, 32 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 137, 139 (2000). In disseminating information to readers or viewers, the media
presents the information in the form of what is more commonly known as a “story.” Id.
See Richard Rosen, Comment, A Call for Legislative Response to New York’s Narrow
Interpretation of the Newsperson’s Privilege: Knight-Ridder Broadcasting Inc. v. Greenberg, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 285, 285 (1988). Typically, in an effort to present the most accurate
information to the public at large, newsgatherers tend to accumulate a surplus of
information, the bulk of which is never used in the actual story. Id.
37
Alexander, supra note 10, at 102. Confidential sources have facilitated newsgathering
in several ways: (i) they help journalists acquire information that is otherwise inaccessible;
(ii) they cultivate sources by burrowing deeper than reporters are able to; (iii) they build
trust; and, (iv) they give confidence and protection to apprehensive sources. Id. See
William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L.
REV. 1453, 1462–64 (2008). In the context of national and international news, confidential
sources tend to be current and former high-level government agency officials and members
of the President’s administration. See id.; John D. Castiglione, A Structuralist Critique of the
Journalist’s Privilege, 23 J. L. & POL. 115, 137–39 (2007); Louis J. Capocasale, Comment, Using
the Shield as a Sword: An Analysis of How the Current Congressional Proposals for a Reporter’s
Shield Law Wound the Fifth Amendment, 20 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 339, 349 n.47
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confidential source, including the source’s identity, is valuable in many
legal proceedings or investigations.38 Thus, the interests of third parties,
such as a criminal defendant, a civil litigant, or the government, compete
with the media’s interest in maintaining confidentiality.39 This creates a
natural tension between journalists, litigants, and the government, which
is usually broken by the issuance of a subpoena or court order requiring
a journalist to testify about his confidential sources or confidential
information.40 Such a scenario places the journalist in a difficult position
where he must weigh the legal ramifications of refusing to testify against
the ethical consequences of testifying and disclosing a source or
confidential information.41 This problem has caused the media to turn to
(2006) (citing Olga Puerto, When Reporters Break Their Promises to Sources: Towards a
Workable Standard in Confidential Source/Breach of Contract Cases, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 501, 512
(1992)) (same).
38
See generally Randall D. Eliason, The Problems with the Reporter’s Privilege, 57 AM. U. L.
REV. 1341, 1350–54 (2008) (noting the value that a journalist’s confidential information
could have to a party during criminal and civil litigation).
39
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688 (stressing that grand juries must be able to hear every
man’s evidence and should have the right to subpoena any and all witnesses); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 206 (1957) (concluding that Congress has the power to require
compulsory disclosure of any information that falls within its legislative sphere);
Papandrea, supra note 33, at 541–42 (suggesting that shield laws aid and hinder law
enforcement’s efforts to prevent crime); Eliason, The Problems with the Reporter’s Privilege,
supra note 38, at 1350–54 (discussing the practice of prosecutors and litigants to subpoena
journalists to gain access to information pertaining to a case); Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and
Fourth Estate Inmates, supra note 34, at 444–45 (stating that in cases concerning the reporter’s
privilege criminal defendants and litigants have the right to confront the evidence against
them).
40
See generally Alexander & Bush, supra note 15, at 219–24 (describing that subpoenas
are the way in which most litigants or government officials attempt to access a reporter’s
confidential information and conducting a study of which type of sources and information
were more likely to be the target of a subpoena). Timothy L. Alger, Comment, Promises Not
to be Kept: The Illusory Newsgatherer’s Privilege in California, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 155, 167
(1991). Aside from the journalist’s testimony, the targets of these subpoenas and court
orders are the documents, notes, films, tapes, and other discovery materials that the
reporter has compiled and organized from the source. Id. This secondary evidence, which
is usually the reporter’s own work product and thought-process, can be invaluable and
highly credible because of a journalist’s tendency to take copious “notes and
photographs . . . to seek out controversies, and their independence of the disputing parties”
which also “makes journalists attractive and particularly credible witnesses.” Id.
41
See Alger, supra note 40, at 166–67. With respect to legal punishment, the news
organizations are generally subject to civil penalties for those reporters they employ;
however, “[f]or uncooperative reporters . . . the courts favor imprisonment.” Id. at 166.
The most common punishment for a noncompliant reporter is being cited for contempt,
which can lead to jail time or monetary fines. Id. at 166–67. See also David G. Savage, ExReporter Told to Reveal Sources or Pay Daily Fines, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2008, at 8, available at
2008 WLNR 4748486. An example of such a fine occurred in March 2008 when, in response
to a former USA Today reporter’s refusal to disclose her sources, a court ordered the
payment of a fine starting out at five hundred dollars per day for one week, then rising to
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state legislatures and ask that the legislatures grant a reporter’s privilege
via the enactment of a state reporter’s shield law.42
one thousand dollars per day the next week, and finally capping out at five thousand
dollars per day until she complied with her subpoena. Id. Additionally, the court barred
her former publisher, family, friends, or any anonymous supporters from paying her fines.
Id.
A journalist’s predicament as to revealing his confidential sources is compounded by
the sacred tenet of journalism to protect one’s source. Alger, supra note 40, at 169 n.78
(quoting DONALD M. GILLMOR ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 358
(5th ed. 1990)). Fargo, The Year of Leaking Dangerously: Shadowy Sources, Jailed Journalists,
and the Uncertain Future of the Federal Journalist’s Privilege, supra note 33, at 1068. “There is a
long history of journalists claiming they should not have to reveal the identities of their
sources for news stories.” Id. Michael Dicke, Note, Promises and the Press: First Amendment
Limitations on News Source Recovery for Breach of a Confidentiality Agreement, 73 MINN L. REV.
1553, 1565 n.64 (1989) (citing AMERICAN NEWSPAPER GUILD, CODE OF ETHICS (1934)). This
history can be traced to when the American Newspaper Guild (A.N.G.) adopted and
published its Code of Ethics in 1934. Id. Specifically, the A.N.G. adopted a canon in its
Code of Ethics which provided that “[n]ewspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or
disclose sources of confidential information in court or before judicial or investigating
bodies.” Id. See also Joseph W. Ragusa, Comment, Biting the Hand That Feeds You: The
Reporter-Confidential Source Relationship in the Wake of Cohen v. Cowles Media Company, 67
ST. JOHNS L. REV. 125, 142 n.85 (1993) (citing Dicke, supra, at 1565 n.64) (stressing the
significance in the journalistic profession of protecting sources and information from
discovery).
42
See Elizabeth A. Graham, Comment, Uncertainty Leads to Jail Time: The Status of the
Common-Law Reporter’s Privilege, 56 DEPAUL L. REV 723, 751–52 (2007) (noting the
importance that state legislatures have played in the development of reporter’s shield
laws). ULMER, supra note 11, at § 37:3. The press is resorting to state legislatures because
the federal government has been unable to pass legislation creating protection for reporters
in this regard, and the federal courts lack consensus on whether a reporter’s privilege exists
under the First Amendment. Id. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, at § 5426.
Reporter’s shield laws codify the common law reporter’s privilege, which has its origins in
English common law. See id. (noting that in Eighteenth Century England a journalist’s
refusal to reveal confidential information often resulted in an ineffectual short-term jailing,
which yielded, in effect, a de facto reporter’s privilege because journalists could keep the
confidentiality of their sources if they were willing to spend a few days in jail).
See Paul Allee Curtis, Comment, New Limits on Freedom of the Press: Newsperson’s
Qualified Privilege Fails to Protect Nonconfidential Videotape Outtakes—State v. Salisbury, 34
IDAHO L. REV. 191, 194–95 n.21 (1997). Also, the theory of a reporter’s privilege has been
found under the First Amendment to the federal constitution, albeit not by the U.S.
Supreme Court, state constitutions, and the common law. Id.; Sherwin, supra note 36, at
149. But see, Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667 (declaring that there is no reporter’s privilege under
the Constitution or at the common law). Nevertheless, several federal circuits do recognize
a reporter’s privilege under the First Amendment. See Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir.
1995); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Burke, 700
F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe
Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126; Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th
Cir. 1978), opinion supplemented, reh’g denied, 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S
1041 (1981); United States v. Steelhammer, 561 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1977); Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977). See also 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2008). Furthermore,
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The competing interests involved in the creation of shield laws have
fueled a deep-seated rift at the state level.43 Although the controversy
lies at the state level, its origin is found in the federal system with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Branzburg.44

regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice also give credence to the notion of a
qualified reporter’s privilege. Id. (establishing requirements for when a newsgatherer can
be compelled to testify). Campagnolo, supra note 1, at 478–79. Another persuasive
argument for finding some form of a reporter’s privilege is found under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, specifically Rule 501 which pertains to privileges based on state law. Id. For
compelling discussions and arguments advocating Supreme Court recognition of a
reporter’s privilege via Rule 501 see Fargo & McAdoo, Common Law or Shield Law? How
Rule 501 Could Solve the Journalist’s Privilege Problem,, supra note 16; Graham, supra, at 725–
27; Jeffrey S. Nestler, Comment, The Underprivileged Profession: The Case for Supreme Court
Recognition of the Journalist’s Privilege, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 201, 250–55 (2005).
Weinberg, supra note 33, at 174–75. Furthermore, fourteen states have recognized a
common law reporter’s privilege under either the United States Constitution or their
corresponding state constitution. Id. Wyoming is the only state that has not adopted a
common law reporter’s privilege or a shield law. Id. See also William E. Lee, The Priestly
Class: Reflections on a Journalist’s Privilege, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 635, 651 n.80 (2006)
(explaining the same). The state courts that have adopted a common law reporter’s
privilege and the leading cases from those states are as follows: Idaho, In re Contempt of
Wright, 700 P.2d 40 (Idaho 1985); Iowa, Bell v. City of Des Moines, 412 N.W.2d 585 (Iowa
1987); Kansas, State v. Sandstrom, 581 P.2d 812 (Kan. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979);
Massachusetts, In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 574 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 1991);
Mississippi, Pierce v. The Clarion Ledger, 433 F. Supp. 2d 754 (S.D. Miss. 2006); Missouri,
Classic III, Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); New Hampshire, New
Hampshire v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499 (N.H. 1982); South Dakota, Hopewell v. Midcontinent
Broadcasting Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780 (S.D. 1995); Texas, Channel Two Television Co. v.
Dickerson, 725 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Vermont, State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254
(Vt. 1974); Virginia, Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1974); West Virginia,
State ex rel. Hudok v. Henry, 389 S.E.2d 188 (W. Va. 1989); Wisconsin, Zelenka v. State, 266
N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1978).
43
See Anthony L. Fargo, The Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential Information in States
Without Shield Laws, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 241, 257–58 (2002) (the journalist’s privilege has
developed in an ad hoc manner in state jurisdictions, thus sparking widespread
disagreement about protection for nonconfidential sources and information); Graham,
supra note 42, at 751 (“State shield laws provide various levels of protection for
reporters . . . . [F]rom near-complete protection to protection only in very specific
situations.”).
44
See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706 (stating that the federal constitution does not
include a common law reporter’s privilege, but the states are free to enact legislation that
gives protection to journalists). See also David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 429, 487 (2002) (explaining how the confusion at the federal level quickly transcended
to the states). For a summary of Branzburg’s effect on the actions of state legislatures and
the reporter’s shield laws they have enacted, see infra Part II.B (explaining the Supreme
Court’s decision in Branzburg and how its “blank check” to the states has created the statesplit that is the focus of this Note).
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B. A Beautiful Disaster
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
privilege existed under the First Amendment that exempted a reporter
from being compelled to testify about or disclose confidential sources
and information to grand juries.45
In Branzburg, reporters were
subpoenaed to testify about articles based on information gained from
confidential sources.46 In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that no
common law reporter’s privilege existed under the First Amendment,
and journalists could not refuse to testify before a state or federal grand
jury.47 Justice White’s majority opinion rejected the claim that the
decision would have a “chilling effect” on the gathering and reporting of
news because the argument was “widely divergent and to a great extent
speculative.”48 Therefore, the majority concluded that newsgatherers did
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667. The Branzburg decision consolidated four separate cases,
each of which involved newspaper and television reporters who had been subpoenaed to
testify before state or federal grand juries about stories they had written pertaining to
illegal drug usage and subversive political groups. Id. at 667–79. Justice White delivered
the majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun and
Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 667. Also, Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion and Justices
Douglas and Stewart dissented. Id. at 709, 711, 725. Justice Stewart’s dissent was joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 725.
46
Id. at 667–79. In each of the cases, the lower courts denied the journalists’ motions to
quash the subpoenas. See id. The Kentucky and Massachusetts state courts concluded that
a reporter did not have a common law privilege to refuse to testify before a grand jury. See
Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, did recognize that a reporter could keep
their source’s confidentiality if the government was unable to show a compelling need. Id.
at 679.
47
Id. at 667. Even though Justice White conceded that newsgatherers were entitled to
some constitutional protection, he emphasized that a journalist’s duty to comply with a
grand jury subpoena was no different than that of any other citizen. Id. at 702–03. Justice
White adamantly announced that “without some protection for seeking out the news,
freedom of the press could be eviscerated.” Id. at 681. Justice White explained, however,
that absent prior restraints or restrictions on the press’s speech, a simple grand jury
subpoena did not amount to an infringement of free speech or press. Id. Further
substantiating his conclusion, Justice White looked to the historical significance of the
grand jury, as well as the indispensable tasks which it performs, and emphasized that “[a]t
common law, courts consistently refused to recognize the existence of any privilege
authorizing a newsman to refuse to reveal confidential information to a grand jury.” Id. at
685. The rationale, in Justice White’s eyes, was that the grand jury required that “every
man’s evidence” be heard. Id. at 687. Moreover, Justice White voiced the important public
policy interests in efficient grand jury proceedings and successful law enforcement
investigations and opined that the secrecy surrounding a grand jury’s work would provide
sufficient protection for a reporter’s confidential sources and information. Id. at 687–88.
See also infra note 50 (explaining that due to the somewhat ambiguous wording of Justice
Powell’s concurrence, several of the federal circuits have concluded that Branzburg was a
plurality).
48
Id. at 693–94. Campagnolo, supra note 1, at 451–53. The “chilling effect” is an
extremely important concern, however, because news organizations rely heavily on
45
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not have a privilege to resist compelled disclosure of confidential sources
and information in the context of a grand jury subpoena.49
Justice Powell filed an “enigmatic” concurrence which limited the
majority’s holding.50 Justice Powell highlighted that journalists were not
confidential sources. Id. For instance, in a recent study, the Wall Street Journal determined
that around fifteen percent of its articles in the 1970s were based on confidential
information. Id. at 453. See Fargo, The Year of Leaking Dangerously: Shadowy Sources, Jailed
Journalists, and the Uncertain Future of the Federal Journalist’s Privilege, supra note 33, at 1073.
This chilling effect could have dire ramifications for the public because the free flow of
information creates an educated and well-informed citizenry that supports our elected
officials in their decision-making process. Id. at 1073 (citing generally ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)). James Thomas
Tucker & Stephen Wermiel, Enacting a Reasonable Federal Shield Law: A Reply to Professors
Clymer and Eliason, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1291, 1326 (2008). Confidential sources are essential to
the workings of our Republic, for without them the news media would be “reduced to
simply regurgitating official versions of news events, versions that may be incomplete or
inadequate.” Id.
49
Branzburg, 405 U.S. at 702–04. In addition, at the conclusion of his opinion, Justice
White wrote the states a “blank check” when he observed that state legislatures were “free,
within First Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards in light of the conditions
and problems with respect to the relations between law enforcement officials and press.”
Id. at 706. Thus, the Court was “powerless to bar state courts from responding in their own
way and construing their own constitutions so as to recognize a newsman’s privilege,
either qualified or absolute.” Id.
50
Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See Rodney A. Smolla, The First Amendment,
Journalists, and Sources: A Curious Study in “Reverse Federalism,” 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1423,
1426 (2008). Justice Powell’s concurrence has become the centerpiece of controversy and
uncertainty swirling around the Court’s decision in Branzburg and has been characterized
as ambiguous, opaque, cryptic, and a model of muddle. Id. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–
10 (Powell, J., concurring). Though Justice Powell’s concurrence was brief, composed of
just two paragraphs and a footnote, it placed a substantial limitation on the holding of the
majority. See id.; Laura Durity, Note, Shielding Journalist-“Bloggers”: The Need to Protect
Newsgathering Despite the Distributing Medium, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 11, 14 n.35
(citing Adam Liptak, The Hidden Federal Shield Law: On the Justice Department’s Regulations
Governing Subpoenas to the Press, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 227, 231). Moreover, the
limitation was so severe that the practical effect of Justice Powell’s concurrence has been to
erode Branzburg’s five-to-four majority decision into a four-one-four plurality. Id.; Rodney
A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1097, 1102 n.18 (1999) (judging Branzburg to be a four-one-four plurality). See In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Hence, numerous
federal circuits have seized upon this limiting language and used it to interpret Branzburg
as a plurality, thus allowing for the finding of a reporter’s privilege under the First
Amendment or the common law. Id. The D.C. Circuit has acknowledged that several
federal circuits interpret Branzburg as a plurality and hence recognize a reporter’s privilege
under the First Amendment. Id. See also Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1995)
(finding Branzburg to be a plurality and employing Justice Powell’s concurrence to find a
common law reporter’s privilege under the First Amendment); United States v. Caporale,
806 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983) (same); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 663 F.2d
583 (1st Cir. 1980) (same); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (same); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.
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without constitutional rights to gather news and protect their sources.51
Further, Justice Powell made it explicitly clear that the appropriate
protection for newsgatherers was not a shield law, but was a motion to
quash the grand jury’s subpoena or a motion for a protective order.52 In
contrast, Justice Douglas dissented and vigorously advocated for an
absolute privilege that allowed journalists to keep the confidentiality of
their sources and information indefinitely.53 Justice Stewart dissented as
well and argued the majority’s holding would annex the media as an
investigative arm of government, which chilled the dissemination of
information to the public.54 Hence, Justice Stewart determined that a
1978), opinion supplemented, reh’g denied, 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1041 (1981) (same); United States v. Steelhammer, 561 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1977) (same);
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977) (same).
51
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell stressed that a
grand jury’s good faith operation requires that the relationship between a reporter’s
information and the grand jury’s own investigation must not be too remote and tenuous.
Id. at 710.
52
Id. The main reason Justice Powell opposed the recognition of any kind of privilege,
particularly a qualified privilege, was because it would necessitate the creation and
implementation of a balancing test. Id. Justice Powell argued the interests of the
newsgatherer could be properly judged and balanced in the context of a motion to quash or
requesting a protective order. Id. As he explained, any claimed privilege “should be
judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.” Id.
(emphasis added). See Paul Marcus, The Reporter’s Privilege: An Analysis of the Common
Law, Branzburg v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 815, 837–39
(1984). The glaring flaw in Justice Powell’s concurrence, and undoubtedly the source of the
current circuit split at the federal level, was that Justice Powell’s usage of the terms “proper
balance” and “balance” implies a balancing test, and thus something along the lines of a
qualified privilege was appropriate under certain factual conditions. Id.
53
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 713 (Douglas, J., dissenting). A qualified privilege, in Justice
Douglas’ eyes, was not necessary because “all of the ‘balancing’ was done by those who
wrote the Bill of Rights.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Justice Douglas reasoned that the First
Amendment affords people an absolute freedom to their opinions, beliefs, and to the
information they generate in the course of testing their opinions and beliefs. Id. at 714–15.
Thus, the majority’s decision would “have two retarding effects upon the ear and the pen
of the press. Fear of exposure will cause dissidents to communicate less openly to trusted
reporters. And, fear of accountability will cause editors and critics to write with more
restrained pens.” Id. at 721. As such, the public’s right to know and the free flow of
information would be rendered nonexistent. See id. Furthermore, Justice Douglas relied
heavily on conclusion that “[t]he First and Tenth Amendments protect the governing
‘powers’ of the people from abridgment by the agencies which are established as their
servants.” Id. at 714 (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute,
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 254 (1961)) (emphasis omitted).
54
Id. at 725. Justice Stewart argued that these concerns effectuated a constitutional right
for a reporter to protect his sources and forced disclosure could only be enforced if there
was a compelling interest at stake. See id. Justice Stewart believed that if newsgatherers
had no protection the media’s role as a watchdog would be severely curtailed. Id. at 727.
Further, Justice Stewart emphasized the necessity of confidential sources to maintain the
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qualified privilege was needed to balance the interests of the reporter
with those of third parties in order to bring about the most judicious and
equitable result.55
There is much confusion and difficulty regarding precisely what
Branzburg means.56 First, Justice Douglas was the only Justice who
supported the recognition of an absolute reporter’s privilege under the
First Amendment.57 Also, Justice Powell and the four dissenting Justices
agreed that newsgatherers were entitled to some measure of protection
from compulsory disclosure.58 Three justices, and possibly Justice
Powell, approved of a qualified privilege that would balance the
interests of the parties concerned when a court determines whether to
compel disclosure of a journalist’s confidential sources or information.59
effectiveness of the newsgathering process. See id. at 726–29. In support of his cause,
Justice Stewart pointed out that although the grand jury played an important role in the
administration of justice, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments already limited the power of
the grand jury, so an additional limitation to maintain the free flow of information under
the First Amendment was practical and logical. Id. at 737.
55
See id. at 736–44. To balance these interests, Justice Stewart explained and proposed a
balance test that required the government to demonstrate: (1) probable cause the reporter
has information that is relevant to a probable violation of law; (2) the information sought
cannot be obtained through any alternative means; and, (3) the defendant has a compelling
and overriding interest in accessing the information. Id. at 743.
56
Lucy A. Dalglish & Casey Murray, Déjà vu All Over Again: How a Generation of Gains in
Federal Reporter’s Privilege Law is Being Reversed, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 13, 20–21
(2006). See Campagnolo, supra note 1, at 469–70. There are three generally recognized
exceptions to Branzburg: civil litigation, the Sixth Amendment, and reporters who witness
the crime. Id.
57
See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 48, at 1301. Also, “[a]ll nine Justices agreed that
journalists were protected from bad faith grand jury investigations,” yet the majority failed
to specify what circumstances rendered a grand jury’s actions to be in bad faith. Id. On a
different note, no federal circuit has sided with Justice Douglas’ opinion and recognized an
absolute privilege. Id. at 1304. Several state supreme courts, on the other hand, have
followed Justice Douglas’ reasoning and established an absolute privilege under the federal
constitution, their corresponding state constitution, or the common law. See id. at 1302–03.
58
See Michele Bush Kimball, The Intent Behind the Cryptic Concurrence That Provided a
Reporter’s Privilege, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 379, 380 (2008) (describing the decision not as a
five to four majority, but as a four-and-a-half to four-and-a-half plurality, due to the
wording of Justice Powell’s concurrence).
59
See id. at 379–81. Justice Powell’s concurrence has been interpreted as creating a
plurality by the federal courts and also as advocating the use of some kind of balancing test
because of the repeated use of the word “balance” and the phrase “case-by-case basis” in
his opinion. Id. at 393–94. Justice Powell, however, never provided a specific test; rather he
alluded to a broader test that would fairly balance the interests of the journalist and the
government. Id. Indeed it appears that Justice Powell may have favored a qualified
privilege but simply disagreed with Justice Stewart’s requirement that the government
demonstrate a compelling interest to obtain the journalist’s information. Id. at 402
(conducting a historical analysis of Justice Powell’s concurrence in Branzburg by comparing
his opinion to his personal papers and memoirs). See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 n* (Powell,
J., concurring). Such is evident in the final sentence of Justice Powell’s footnote that “[t]he
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Overall, Branzburg and its “blank check” to the states have been nothing
more than a model of muddle because the decision failed to give the
states any guidance as to what type of privilege a reporter’s shield law
should grant to newsgatherers.60 Hence, Branzburg’s blank check has
allowed the states to cash in.61
C. How the States Have Cashed in on the Blank Check
This Section focuses on the state split as to which type of privilege a
reporter’s shield law should grant to journalists.62 First, this Section
furnishes a brief survey of the states and the privileges their shield laws
provide to reporters.63 Next, this Section delineates those provisions of
reporter’s shield laws upon which the states agree.64 Finally, it considers
the contemporary issue that has sparked widespread disagreement
among the states: the scope of the privilege that reporter’s shield laws
should grant to journalists to resist compulsory disclosure.65
1.

A Brief Survey: The Split at a Glance

Thirty-six jurisdictions in the United States have reporter’s shield
laws in place.66 Twenty-three states grant a newsgatherer a qualified
privilege to be free from compulsory disclosure except where a court is
new constitutional rule endorsed by that dissenting opinion would, as a practical matter,
defeat such a fair balancing and the essential societal interest in the detection and
prosecution of crime would be heavily subordinated.” Id.
60
See Smolla, The First Amendment, Journalists, and Sources, supra note 50, at 1426
(referring to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Branzburg as a model of muddle due to the
controversy that still surrounds the decision to this day). See also infra Part II.C (examining
the state split in great detail).
61
See infra Part II.C (describing the four types of privileges that states employ in
reporter’s shield laws).
62
See infra Part II.C.3 (describing the four generic privileges that are employed by the
states: (1) an absolute privilege; (2) a qualified privilege; (3) a blended privilege; and, (4)
immunity from contempt).
63
See infra Part II.C.1 (offering a short assessment as to which states adhere to which
privilege).
64
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the two portions of reporter’s shield laws upon which
the states concur: those newsgatherers who are protected by shield laws and the
proceedings in which the shield laws apply).
65
See infra Part II.C.3 (outlining the four privileges granted to journalists by state
reporter’s shield laws and elaborating on the scope of protection they grant to members of
the media, how they apply, and the public policy concerns that underlie the different
privileges).
66
See Fargo, Analyzing Federal Shield Law Proposals: What Congress Can Learn from the
States, supra note 2, 46–48 (listing the states that have enacted reporter’s shield laws). See
also supra note 31 (listing the states, as well as the corresponding citations to their shield
laws, that have enacted such legislation).
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convinced that the privilege should be divested.67 Alternatively, ten
states provide journalists an absolute privilege to resist compulsory
disclosure in all situations.68 Further, two jurisdictions, New York and
the District of Columbia, use a blended privilege granting journalists an
absolute privilege to keep the confidentiality of their sources and a
modified qualified privilege to maintain the confidentiality of the
information obtained from those sources.69 Finally, California is the only
state that grants journalists immunity from being held in contempt for
refusing to reveal confidential sources and information.70
2.

States in Agreement

Despite inconsistencies, states tend to agree on two main aspects of
shield laws: the proceedings in which they apply and the types of
newsgatherers protected.71 With respect to proceedings, even though
67
See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300–09.25.390 (1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982)
& ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2214 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (West 1987); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-119 & COLO. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-72.5-101 to 24-72.5-106 (West 1993);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146T (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1992); FLA. STAT.
§ 90.5015 (1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (West 1993); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901 (West
1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451–45:1459 (West 1992); ME. PUB. L. CH. 654, signed into
law on April 18, 2008; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (West 1992); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 767.5A (1982); MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021–595.025 (1998); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:84A-21–
2A:84A-21.13 (1996); N.M. STAT. § 38-6-7 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (1999); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506 (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to 919.1-3 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1996); WASH.
REV. CODE § 5.68.010 (2007). The states that have enacted shield laws bestowing journalists
with qualified privileges include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Washington.
68
See ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1986); 2008 HAW. SESS. LAWS ch. 240 § 1 (effective July 2,
2008); IND. CODE § 34-46-4-1–34-46-4-2 (1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (West 1990);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to 26-1-903 (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to 20-147 (1992);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 49.275–49.385 (1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04 & 2739.11–2739.12
(West 1990); OR. REV. STAT., §§ 44.510–44.540 (1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942 (1993). Those
states employing absolute privileges are: Alabama, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania.
69
See, e.g, D.C. CODE §§ 16-4701 to 16-4704 (1992) (providing an absolute privilege to a
reporter to keep confidential the identity of a confidential source and a modified qualified
privilege to maintain the confidence of certain information); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H
(McKinney 1996) (same).
70
CAL. CONST. ART. 1, § 2 (1993). See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1993) (codifying
California’s reporter’s shield law into the state’s rules of evidence); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1986.1 (West 2001) (codifying California’s shield law into the state’s rules of civil
procedure).
71
See Douglas H. Frazer, Comment, The Newsperson’s Privilege in Grand Jury Proceedings:
An Argument for Uniform Recognition and Application, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 413, 413
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Branzburg took place in a grand jury setting, states have designed their
shield laws to apply in grand jury, criminal, civil, and other judicial
proceedings and law enforcement investigations.72 Generally speaking,
however, shield laws have a greater impact in criminal proceedings and
investigations than in civil litigation.73
The types of newsgatherers protected by shield laws vary from state
to state.74 As a general proposition, states have adopted very broad
definitions of what constitutes a journalist for the purpose of invoking a
shield law’s privilege.75 Practically every state’s shield law protects any
(1984) (stating that state reporter’s shield laws are applied in grand jury proceedings and
investigations, criminal trials, and civil proceedings). See generally Karl H. Schmid,
Journalist’s Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An Analysis of United States Courts of Appeals’
Decisions From 1973 to 1999, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1441 (2002) (discussing how state
reporter’s shield laws have been applied in state criminal proceedings and investigations
and how these applications have been challenged and interpreted in federal court). For
discussions considering how state reporter’s shield laws have been interpreted in the
federal courts through Federal Rule of Evidence 501 see Fargo & McAdoo, Common Law or
Shield Law? How Rule 501 Could Solve the Journalist’s Privilege Problem,, supra note 16;
Graham, supra note 42, at 725–27; Nestler, supra note 42, at 250–55.
72
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-46-4-2 (1998) (requiring the shield law’s absolute privilege
apply in any legal proceedings or elsewhere); FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998) (stating the state’s
qualified privilege gives a newsgatherer the privilege not to be a witness concerning their
confidential sources and information); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907 (1985) (providing the
shield law’s qualified privilege will order disclosure only if a court finds after a hearing
that divestment of the privilege is justified); D.C. CODE § 16-4702 (1992) (stating that the
shield law applies to any judicial, legislative, administrative, or other body with the power
to issue a subpoena); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (McKinney 1996) (stating the shield law
applies “in connection with any civil or criminal proceeding, or by the legislature or other
body having contempt powers”).
73
See, e.g., Rosato v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 444 n.14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)
(“[I]n a civil discovery proceeding there is not a sufficient compelling state or public
interest to outweigh the conditional First Amendment right not to disclose sources.”);
Papandrea, supra note 33, at 557 n.234 (citing Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir.
1981)) (“[I]n the ordinary case the civil litigant’s interest in disclosure should yield to the
journalist’s privilege.”).
74
See Fargo, The Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential Information in States Without
Shield Laws, supra note 43, at 257–58 (emphasizing the different approaches that states
adhere to in their reporter’s shield laws and noting that the varying definition of a reporter
results in journalists being protected under one jurisdiction’s shield law but not under
another). See also infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text (discussing the generally broad
definition of a newsgatherer that nearly all states have adopted).
75
See IND. CODE § 34-46-4-1 (1998) ((1) anyone “connected with . . . or employed by:
(A) a newspaper or other periodical . . . ; or (B) recognized press association or wire
service” or (2) with a licensed radio or television); FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998) (“[P]erson
regularly engaged in collecting, photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting, or
publishing news, for gain or livelihood, who obtained the information sought while
working as a salaried employee of, or independent contractor for, a newspaper, news
journal, news agency, press association, wire service, radio or television station, network,
or news magazine.”).
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employee who is affiliated with any kind of news medium that
broadcasts or publishes at regular intervals.76 Today, however, the only
journalists most states exclude from protection are independent
reporters; namely, those who use the Internet as their medium of
dissemination, such as bloggers and e-journalists.77
3.

The Current Controversy

Presently, states are at odds as to the extent of protection a shield
law’s privilege should grant to members of the media.78 The privileges
offered by state reporter’s shield laws can be placed into four general
categories: (i) an absolute privilege; (ii) a qualified privilege; (iii) a
blended privilege; and (iv) immunity from contempt.79
a.

The Absolute Privilege

An example of a state with a shield law that guarantees an absolute
privilege is Indiana.80 In 1999, Indiana’s legislature recodified the state’s
See supra note 75; infra notes 84, 91, 102 (stating the broad definitions of the term
journalist that are often incorporated into state reporter’s shield laws).
77
See Durity, supra note 50, at 36–38 (discussing the need for reporter’s shield laws to
draw a line between legitimate journalists and independent journalists who post directly to
the Internet). See also Nathan Fennessy, Comment, Bringing Bloggers into the Journalistic
Privilege Fold, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 1059, 1075–78 (2006) (arguing that bloggers should be
included under the definition of journalist because most bloggers post pursuant to an
agreement of some kind with a legitimate news or media organization); Stephanie J. Frazee,
Note, Bloggers as Reporters: An Effect-Based Approach to First Amendment Protections in a New
Age of Information Dissemination, 8 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 609, 625–31 (2006) (contending
that all bloggers and e-journalists whose objective is to disseminate legitimate news should
be protected under reporter’s shield laws).
78
See Alexander & Bush, supra note 15, at 216–18 (discussing the split among the states
as to the type of privilege to incorporate in a reporter’s shield law); Fargo, Analyzing Federal
Shield Law Proposals: What Congress Can Learn from the States, supra note 2, 46–49 (same). See
infra Part II.C.3 (detailing the state split in depth). For a complete survey of the states and
case law regarding reporter’s shield laws, see, supra note 3 (providing a thorough outline of
the states that have adopted reporter’s shield laws as well as those states and federal
circuits that have opted to adopt a common law reporter’s privilege); Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press, Privilege Compendium, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/ (last
visited Aug. 6, 2009) (listing information concerning current state reporter’s shield laws, the
scope of each law, the privilege it grants, and the cases interpreting the shield law).
79
See infra Part II.C.3 (explaining the various privileges and using as illustrations
Indiana’s shield law as an example of the absolute privilege, Florida’s and Illinois’ shield
laws as models of the qualified privilege, New York’s and the District of Columbia’s shield
laws exemplifies the blended approach, and California’s demonstrates immunity from
contempt).
80
See IND. CODE § 34-46-4-2 (1998) (stating that a person falling under the provisions of
the Indiana reporter’s shield law would be free from compulsory disclosure in any legal
proceedings or elsewhere). See also supra note 68 (listing the other states that have adopted
76
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previous shield law, which gave newsgatherers an absolute privilege.81
The recodification attempted to limit the effect of case law that had
developed in the Indiana courts that appeared to support a qualified
privilege.82 Since the inception of the current shield law, however, the

shield laws that grant an absolute privilege to newsgatherers to resist compelled
disclosure).
81
See Jamerson v. Anderson Newspapers, Inc, 469 N.E.2d 1243, 1246 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984), overruled on different grounds, McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2000)
(concluding the 1973 version of Indiana’s shield law conferred, without a doubt, an
absolute privilege to newsgatherers); Hestand v. State, 273 N.E.2d 282, 283 (Ind. 1971). The
only limitation that the courts placed on the absolute privilege was that it was personal to
newsmen and others could not invoke its protections. Id. (emphasizing that Indiana’s
reporter’s shield law creates a personal right for the reporter that cannot be invoked by the
any other person regardless of whether he is connected to the litigation). See also Lipps v.
State, 258 N.E.2d 622, 626 (Ind. 1970) (same).
See Hestand, 273 N.E.2d at 283. Indiana, which has changed or altered its reporter’s
shield law several times, was one of seventeen states to have enacted a reporter’s shield law
prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Branzburg. Id. (listing the legislative history of
the Indiana shield law: “Acts of 1941, Ch. 44, § 1, p. 128, Acts of 1949, Ch. 201, § 1, p. 673,
1968 Repl. Burns’ Ind.Stat.Ann. § 2-1733, IC 1971, 34-3-5-1,” amended by § 34-3-5-1 (1993)).
See also Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Bradley, 462 N.E.2d 1321, 1324 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984) (giving the 1973 version of Indiana’s shield law and accompanying legislative
history); Jamerson, 469 N.E.2d at 1247 n.2 (explaining the 1941 version of Indiana’s shield
law “afforded the news media an absolute privilege; however, it included particular
requirements as to the size and circulation of the newspaper”).
82
See, e.g., In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d 1, 10–16 (Ind. 1998) (discussing the conflicting
interpretations of Branzburg and iterating that generally the Indiana courts have followed
the absolute privilege that was enacted by the state’s legislature); WTHR-TV v. Milam, 690
N.E.2d 1174, 1176–77 (Ind. 1998) (concluding that even for a litigant to attempt to access a
newsgatherer’s information he must show some potential materiality, which is reasoning
consistent with a qualified privilege). See In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d at 4. In re WTHR-TV
involved a criminal defendant who had given an interview to a reporter. Id. Subsequent to
the interview and the beginning of the defendant’s criminal proceedings, the defendant’s
attorney subpoenaed the television station to obtain the uncut and unedited videotapes of
the interview. Id. at 5. The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the videotapes could be
discovered subject to in camera review. Id. at 10. The Court discussed the methods of
discovery under Indiana Trial Rules 24(B)(1), 34(B) and 26(C), as well as how the Branzburg
decision factored into whether the station could be compelled to disclose the videotapes of
the interview. Id. at 5–8, 10–12. The Court concluded that in this situation, compulsory
disclosure would not infringe the station’s or the reporter’s First Amendment rights, and
that the inquiry in determining whether disclosure could be compelled was if the
information consisted of particularity, relevance, and a paramount interest in
nondisclosure. See id. at 5–8, 10–15. See Milam, 690 N.E.2d 1174 at 1175. Along those same
lines, Milam, which was decided on the very same day as In re WTHR-TV, involved an
interview conducted with a criminal defendant before trial, which the defendant’s lawyer
subsequently attempted to discover. Id. In this case, however, the defendant’s counsel
simply asked for the material because it was related to the defendant’s case. Id. The Court
concluded that discovery of the videotapes should not be compelled in this instance
because the request for disclosure was not pleaded with particularity, was not material,
and failed to indicate any possible use of the videotapes at the trial. Id. at 1176.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2009], Art. 6

202

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

Indiana judiciary appears to have acquiesced to the judgment of the
legislature, as evidenced by the fact that no cases have interpreted
Section 34-46-4-1 or Section 34-46-4-2 of the Indiana Code.83 Indiana’s
shield law provides that those individuals who fall within the scope of
the statute:84
shall not be compelled to disclose in any legal
proceedings or elsewhere the source of any information
procured or obtained in the course of the person’s
employment or representation . . . whether:
(1) published or not published:
(A) in the newspaper or periodical; or
(b) by the press association or wire service; or
(2) broadcast or not broadcast by the radio station
or television station.85
As shown, the absolute privilege grants complete protection to
journalists. The qualified privilege, on the other hand, is not as broad as
the absolute privilege—it requires a reporter to disclose information if
certain conditions are met.86
b.

The Qualified Privilege

Florida’s shield law expressly grants a qualified privilege that
extends to both confidential and non-confidential information gathered
in the course of a journalist’s employment.87 The Florida Supreme Court

83
See, e.g, In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d at 10–16 (discussing Branzburg and stressing the
importance and reasoning of Justice Powell’s concurrence). The deference given by the
Indiana courts is surprising because the courts appeared to disapprove of the absolute
privilege, yet the absolute privilege remains the law in Indiana. See id.
84
See IND. CODE § 34-46-4-1 (1998) (defining a journalist to be: “(1) any person
connected with, or any person who has been connected with or employed by: (A) a
newspaper or other periodical . . .; or (B) a recognized press association or wire service” or
“(2) any person connected with a licensed radio or television station”).
85
IND. CODE § 34-46-4-2 (1998). See In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d at 13 n.14. The Indiana
Supreme Court clarified in In re WTHR-TV, that “[t]he General Assembly has provided that
a reporter ‘shall not be compelled to disclose in any legal proceedings or elsewhere the
source of any information,’ whether published or not.” Id. See Slone v. State, 496 N.E.2d
401, 405 (Ind. 1986). In addition, the shield law has also been characterized as protecting
“media representatives from being forced to give the sources of their news articles.” Id.
86
See infra Part II.C.3.b (exploring the application and public policy considerations
supporting the adoption of a reporter’s shield law that incorporates a qualified privilege to
resist compulsory disclosure).
87
See FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998) (enacting a qualified privilege for journalists to
maintain the confidence of their information, but providing for divestment of the privilege

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss1/6

Faucette: Your Secret's Safe with Me…or So You Think: How States Have Cash

2009]

Your Secret’s Safe With Me

203

has held that if a reporter established that the qualified privilege
attached, “a court must apply the three-prong balancing test used by an
overwhelming majority of other states to determine whether the
privilege will act to prevent the disclosure of the reporter’s
information.”88 Also, the Florida Supreme Court pronounced the proper
determination must be whether the party attempting to access the
information “has established that: (1) the reporter possesses relevant
information; (2) the same information is not available from alternative
sources; and (3) the movant has a compelling need for any information
the reporter may have.”89 Interestingly, Florida’s law contains several
instances where the shield law does not apply, including to physical
evidence, eyewitness observations, and recordings of crimes.90 Further,

under certain conditions). See also State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 227 (Fla. 1998) (affirming
the application of Florida’s reporter’s shield law as giving journalists a qualified privilege).
88
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 227. The Court reasoned that the development of state reporter’s
shield laws post-Branzburg, as well as the varying state and federal court decisions
recognizing a common law reporter’s privilege, proved that a balancing test was the best
method of determining when a journalist should be compelled to disclose confidential
information or the identity of any confidential source. Id. at 227–28.
89
Id. at 227. The Court also gave examples of such situations, the first of which was in
the context of a criminal prosecution, if the government was seeking compelled disclosure
“it would have to establish that the information was relevant to the crime being
investigated; that the government could not obtain the information from another source;
and that the government has a compelling need to obtain the information to adequately
prosecute the crime at issue.” Id. In weighing the compelling need of the party, however, a
court must not only consider the need for the press to be free and unfettered and the
obligation for courts to hear every man’s evidence, but also to “factor into the equation the
federal and Florida constitutional rights to compulsory and due process so as to ensure that
the defendant receives a fair trial.” Id. Interestingly, in supporting its rationale, the Court
noted that Justice Powell’s concurrence in Branzburg advocating an approach which would
balance the interests of the parties furthered Florida’s emulation of Justice Stewart’s
dissent. Id. at 223–24.
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907 (1985). Other jurisdictions that adhere to the use of a
qualified privilege, such as Illinois, favor a less stringent balancing test which requires
disclosure only if: “(1) . . . the information sought does not concern matters, or details in
any proceeding, required to be kept secret . . .; and (2) . . . all other available sources of
information have been exhausted and, either, disclosure of the information sought is
essential to the protection of the public interest involved.” Id. Thus, under Illinois’ shield
law information only needs to be unprotected as a state secret in order for a party to
attempt to divest the privilege by showing it is essential to protecting the public interest or
all other sources have been exhausted. See id. See also People v. Pawlaczyk, 724 N.E.2d 901,
912–13 (Ill. 2000) (emphasizing that Illinois’ reporter’s shield law reduces the burden on
litigants trying to obtain information that a newsgatherer possesses and that litigants need
not show a compelling need for the information).
90
See FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998); Davis, 720 So. 2d at 227 (holding consistent with the
reporter’s shield law that “the privilege does not apply to eyewitness observations or
physical evidence, including recordings, of a crime”) (emphasis in original). Compare id.,
with Campagnolo, supra note 1, at 469–70 (explaining that there are three general exceptions
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Florida’s shield law provides journalists with a qualified privilege not to
testify about or to disclose information obtained while actively gathering
news unless a party seeking to overcome this privilege can show by clear
and specific evidence that: “(a) The information is relevant and material
to unresolved issues that have been raised . . .; (b) The information
cannot be obtained from alternative sources; and (c) A compelling
interest exists for requiring disclosure.”91
Moreover, the legislative history supporting Florida’s shield law
expressly states that the Florida Legislature intended to provide a
qualified privilege to members of the media who fell within the
definition of a professional journalist.92 Also, the summary of the bill
indicates that a journalist has the power to refuse to be a witness
concerning any information he obtained while actively gathering news.93
According to the Florida Senate Staff’s analysis, the bill would enhance
the media’s ability to collect news by promoting and protecting
confidentiality while at the same time reducing the number of subpoenas
served upon newsgatherers.94 Additionally, in support of the qualified
privilege, the Staff’s analysis stressed the economic impact of the number
of subpoenas served on members of the media and the increased costs to
to the doctrinal framework of Branzburg when its reasoning is made inoperable: civil
litigation, the Sixth Amendment, and reporters who witness the crime).
91
FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (defining professional journalist to encompass any person
involved in “collecting, photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting, or
publishing news, for gain or livelihood, who obtained the information sought while
working as a salaried employee of, or independent contractor for, a newspaper, news
journal, news agency, press association, wire service, radio or television station, network,
or news magazine”).
92
Act of May 12, 1998, S.B. 150, 1998 Fla. Acts 22-150-98, at 2, available at
http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/1998/senate/bills/billtext/pdf/s0150.pdf
(outlining the intentions of the Florida Legislature and the public policy considerations
justifying the Legislature’s intentions).
93
Id. The summary of the bill also provided for compulsory disclosure only when the
conditions of the qualified privilege have been met. Id. See SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND
ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, JOURNALISM: QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE, S.B. 150, at 3 (Fla. 1998),
available
at
http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/1998/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/
SB0150.go.pdf (citing Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976); Kidwell v. State, 696 So. 2d
399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)). Similarly, the legislative history endorses the adoption of
the qualified privilege because Florida’s courts had already recognized a common law
reporter’s privilege and had implemented a balancing test to make the privilege qualified.
Id. Also, the legislative history agrees with Justice Stewart’s dissent in Branzburg and
explained that the adoption of a qualified privilege was pivotal to the interests of litigants,
the public as a whole, and the media. Id. at 4.
94
SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 93, at 1. In addition, the analysis found that the
qualified privilege could possibly impede the discovery of certain evidence held by
reporters in both criminal and civil proceedings. Id. In essence, Florida’s qualified
privilege operates to exclude evidence that could otherwise be admissible and discoverable
at trial, which is similar in some respects to the absolute privilege. Id. at 2.
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litigants to access the information collected by journalists.95 Finally, the
Staff’s analysis recognized that advocates for an absolute privilege relied
too heavily on the argument that the public has a right to know certain
information because no such right is present under either the state or
federal constitutions.96
c.

The Blended Privilege

In recent years, two jurisdictions have developed a new statutory
model by enacting contemporary and flexible shield laws that
accommodate the interests of all parties.97 The District of Columbia’s
shield law grants newsgatherers an absolute privilege to keep sources
confidential, but only a qualified privilege for information a journalist
acquires from confidential sources.98 The D.C. shield law “accords total
protection to news sources, whether confidential or not, and whether
disclosed to others or not.”99 Additionally, the D.C. shield law “prohibits
compulsory disclosure of ‘the source of any news or information’
procured by a journalist ‘acting in an official news-gathering
capacity.’”100 Moreover, the protection conferred to unpublished news
or information may be divested if three requirements are satisfied.101
95
Id. at 5. A problem that the Analysis identified was that the bill did not establish an
explicit standard or burden of proof that challengers must meet to obtain the information
in question. Id. at 4. Additionally, the Analysis noted that the qualified privilege would
likely cause additional hearings in the cases in which it was invoked and would slow down
the adjudicatory process. Id. at 5. This increased burden would be offset, however, by the
reductions in the number of petitions for injunctions to protect reporters. Id.
96
Id. at 6. The balance that Florida’s shield law strikes, according to the Staff Analysis,
causes sources and information to be revealed only in limited instances and would not
hinder the forthcoming of sources with newsworthy information. Id.
97
See infra Part II.C.3.c (explaining that the privilege these two jurisdictions have created
actually blends the absolute privilege with the qualified privilege in order to accommodate
a wide variety of interests).
98
See Lee v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 287 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2003). See D.C. CODE
§ 16-4702 (1992). Additionally, the D.C. shield law applies to sources, whether or not the
source is confidential, and to any published or unpublished information including: notes,
outtakes, photographs, photographic negatives, video tapes, sound tapes, film, or other
data. Id.
99
Grunseth v. Marriott Corp., 868 F. Supp. 333, 336 (D.D.C. 1994). See Joel Kurtzberg &
Karen Kaiser, First Amendment Reporter’s Privilege Challenged in Privacy Act Case, 22 COMM.
LAW. 14, 15 (2004) (stating that the scope of the District of Columbia’s provision extends to
undisclosed information collected during the newsgathering process).
100
Lee, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 17 (citing D.C. CODE § 16-4702(1)) (emphasizing the need for a
journalist to be acting in his reportorial capacity in order for the D.C. reporter’s shield law
to apply, otherwise journalists and litigants could find ways to circumvent the shield law).
101
Grunseth, 868 F. Supp. at 336. The court iterated that the criteria for applying the
shield law’s conditional privilege for maintaining the confidentiality of news or
information closely tracked the analytical framework set forth in Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2009], Art. 6

206

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

The District of Columbia’s shield law provides a modified qualified
privilege which requires disclosure if:
(1) The news or information is relevant to a significant
legal issue before a judicial, legislative, administrative,
or other body that has the power to issue a subpoena;
(2) The news or information could not, with due
diligence, be obtained by any alternative means; and
(3) There is an overriding public interest in the
disclosure.102
A court may not, however, compel the disclosure of the identity of a
source of any information that falls within the shield law’s protection.103
Along these same lines, the New York Legislature enacted a similar
reporter’s shield law that incorporates the blended privilege.104 In
705 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Grunseth, 868 F. Supp. at 336–37. See Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 712. In Zerilli,
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that “when striking the balance between the
civil litigant’s interest in compelled disclosure and the public interest in protecting a
newspaper’s confidential sources, we will be mindful of the preferred position of the First
Amendment and the importance of a vigorous press.” Id. The court emphasized that in
striking this balance the need a litigant has for the information is of central importance,
especially if “the information sought goes to ‘the heart of the matter,’ that is, if it is crucial”
to the case. Id. at 713 (citation omitted). Also, the court imposed a limitation by requiring
that “reporters should be compelled to disclose their sources only after the litigant has
shown that he has exhausted every reasonable alternative source of information.” Id.
102
D.C. CODE § 16-4703. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (McKinney 1996). Similarly,
New York’s shield law mirrors the District of Columbia’s balancing test. See id. (requiring
the moving party to prove the need for the reporter’s information “(i) is highly material
and relevant; (ii) is critical or necessary to the maintenance of a party’s claim, defense or
proof of an issue material thereto; and (iii) is not obtainable from any alternative source”.
Id. § 79-H(c). Moreover, New York’s shield law defines a “Professional journalist” as
anyone involved in the “gathering, preparing, collecting, writing, editing, filming, taping
or photographing of news intended for a newspaper, magazine, news agency, press
association or wire service or other professional medium or agency which has as one of its
regular functions the processing and researching of news intended for dissemination to the
public.” Id. § 79-H(a)(6). Contra D.C. CODE § 16-4701 (opting instead to structure its shield
law to protect “news media” which encompasses: “(1) Newspapers; (2) Magazines; (3)
Journals; (4) Press associations; (5) News agencies; (6) Wire services; (7) Radio; (8)
Television; or (9) Any printed, photographic, mechanical, or electronic means of
disseminating news and information to the public”).
103
D.C. CODE § 16-4703. Accord, N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (giving journalists an
absolute privilege to resist compelled disclosure of the identity of confidential sources).
104
See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (granting newsgatherers an absolute privilege to
maintain the confidentiality of sources and a qualified privilege to keep information gained
from those sources confidential under certain circumstances). See also supra note 102
(describing New York’s reporter’s shield law, the qualified privilege it gives to
newsgatherers to resist disclosure of confidential information, and the shield law’s
definition of journalist).
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commenting on the legislative history of New York’s shield law, the
state’s highest court explained in Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc., v.
Greenberg105 that the “thrust of the Shield Law was aimed at encouraging
a free press by shielding those communications given to the news media
in confidence.”106 In addition, the court made clear that the legislature
did not intend to create an absolute privilege against compelled
disclosure because the legislature had not adopted it in any previous
legislation.107
d.

Immunity Rather than Privilege

The fourth and final option is to simply grant reporters immunity
from being held in contempt for refusing to disclose a confidential source
or confidential information pursuant to a subpoena or court order.108
Although a reporter’s immunity under the California shield law has been
characterized as absolute, it may be overcome under certain
circumstances.109 For example, in Delaney v. Superior Court, the California
70 N.Y.2d 151 (N.Y. 1987) (concluding that the New York reporter’s shield law did not
extend to non-confidential sources or information acquired by a news media organizations
because without an expectation of confidentiality there cannot be an expectation that the
communication or relationship between source and reporter is to remain privileged).
106
Id. at 156 (citing Governor’s Memorandum, 1970 N.Y. Legis. Ann., at 508)
(emphasizing that the Governor made clear in his memorandum to the legislature
regarding New York’s reporter’s shield law that the shield law was enacted to combat the
real and imminent threat of requiring a journalist to disclose his confidential information).
107
Id. at 158. See id. at 163–67 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (focusing in great detail as to the
evolution of the legislative history of New York’s shield law and arguing that the drafters
of the legislation intended for non-confidential information and non-confidential sources to
be protected by the shield law).
108
See CAL. CONST. ART. I. § 2 (1993). Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 939 n.6
(Cal. 1990). To clarify, California’s shield law does not grant any kind of privilege to
members of the media, rather it grants them immunity from being held in contempt by any
judicial or legislative body that has the power to issue a subpoena or compel a witness’
testimony. Id. See also Nora Linda Rousso, Comment, California’s Newsgatherer’s Shield:
Inconsistent Interpretation Means Inadequate Protection, 19 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 347, 351–
55 (1989) (explaining that California’s shield law grants immunity to members of the media
by preventing a journalist from being prosecuted for failing to comply with a subpoena or
court order requiring him to testify about confidential sources or information).
New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 796 P.2d 811, 816 (Cal. 1990) (citing Mitchell v.
Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1984)). Also, the scope of protection offered by
California’s shield law is absolute, not qualified, which allows the shield law to apply to a
journalist’s unpublished and non-confidential information. Id. A journalist’s immunity
does not mean, however, that a court is forbidden from imposing other sanctions if a
reporter refuses to comply with a subpoena or court-ordered testimony. Id. at 817–18.
109
See, e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d at 947–50. The California Supreme Court stressed that
Delaney constituted a narrow qualification that was to be implemented exclusively in
criminal proceedings where a criminal defendant’s state or federal constitutional rights are
imperiled. Id. at 947.
105
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Supreme Court held that in a criminal proceeding the shield law’s
immunity can be surpassed if a criminal defendant shows an acceptable
need for the information.110 For a newsgatherer to be granted immunity
under the California shield law he must prove all of the requirements of
the shield law.111 If such a showing is made, the burden of proof then
shifts to the criminal defendant to establish a reasonable possibility that
the evidence could result in his exoneration.112
Even if the defendant submits enough evidence to divest a reporter
of his immunity, according to the Delaney court a journalist’s
unpublished information is not necessarily subject to disclosure; rather, a
See id. at 948. See also O’Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 1457 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (stressing that the burden of proof is on the journalist seeking to invoke
immunity to establish that the requirements of the shield law have been met, but that a
criminal defendant must carry his own burden of showing the reporter has evidence in his
possession that is important to the defendant’s case). See also People v. Ramos, 101 P.3d
478, 526 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 844 (2005) (stressing that the California reporter’s
shield law requires that before the burden shifts to the journalist to demonstrate the
requirements of the shield law have been established the criminal defendant must first
prove that the information in the journalist’s possession must have a material effect on his
case); People v. Vasco, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 643, 654 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (same). See also
Delaney, 789 P.2d at 948. This does not, however, require that the information that the
journalist possesses go to the heart of the defendant’s case. Id. In explaining the basis for
the rule, the court explained the inquiry must measure the threat to a criminal defendants’
right to a fair trial particularly if he has “demonstrated a reasonable possibility that
evidence sought to be discovered might result in his exoneration, he is entitled to its
discovery.” Id. at 947 (citing CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 251 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978) (emphasis omitted). Moreover, the court emphasized that allowing a
criminal defendant “to discover is based on the fundamental proposition that he is entitled
to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible
information.” Id. at 947–48 (emphasis omitted).
111
Delaney, 789 P.2d at 946 n.20 (citing Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d
388, 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)). The burden that the journalist must satisfy in this situation is
minimal in that Delaney only requires a “prima facie showing by a newsperson that he is
entitled to withhold information under the shield law.” Id. at 948. Thus, in order to shift
the burden to the criminal defendant to prove that immunity should not be granted, a
newsgatherer must initially prove he falls within the shield law’s definition of a journalist,
he has been lawfully subpoenaed, and he does not wish to testify about particular
information. Id. at 948–50. Moreover, this initial requirement, according to the court,
serves the shield law’s primary propose: the protection of the media’s “ability to gather
and report the news.” Id. at 946 n.20.
112
Id. at 948. Yet, the court limited this requirement because it determined that
exoneration was too high of a standard; rather, the court clarified that a defendant must
“show a reasonable possibility the information will materially assist his defense.” Id. at 948
n.24. The distinction between exoneration and assisting the defense is significant. Id. at
948. “‘Exoneration’ means ‘the removal of a burden, charge, responsibility, or duty.’” Id. at
948 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 516, col.2 (5th ed. 1979)) (emphasis omitted). The
court further explained that the burden was on the defendant to make the required
showing, but that the showing need not be specific and it could not rest on mere
speculation. Id. at 948.
110
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balancing test should be employed to properly determine whether a
reporter’s unpublished information could be discovered.113 Hence, for
unpublished information to be disclosed, a court must consider: “(a)
Whether the unpublished information is confidential or sensitive . . . (b)
The interests sought to be protected by the shield law . . . (c) The
importance of the information to the criminal defendant . . . [and] (d)
Whether there is an alternative source for the unpublished
information.”114 These criteria suggest that the California shield law
more closely resembles a qualified privilege than simply a grant of
immunity; nonetheless, as it is worded in the California Constitution, the
shield law makes reporters immune from being held in contempt for
noncompliance with compulsory disclosure.
Specifically, California’s shield law provides that those
newsgatherers falling within the scope of the shield law:
(b) . . . shall not be adjudged in contempt . . . for
refusing to disclose the source of any information
procured . . . for publication . . . or for refusing to
disclose any unpublished information . . . .
Nor . . . adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose
the source of any information procured . . . for news or
news commentary purposes on radio or television, or for
refusing to disclose any unpublished information . . . .115

113
Id. at 949–50. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2(b). Further, the California shield law defines
“unpublished information” as including but “not limited to, all notes, outtakes,
photographs, tapes or other data of whatever sort not itself disseminated to the public
through a medium of communication, whether or not published information based upon
or related to such material has been disseminated.” Id.
114
Delaney, 789 P.2d at 949–50 (emphasis omitted). The court refused to place any weight
on the enumerated factors that would militate in favor of disclosure in one instance and not
in another. Id. Hence, none of the factors named by the court is determinative because
such “[a] mechanistic, checklist approach would not in the long run (nor perhaps even in a
particular case) serve the best interests of either newspersons or criminal defendants.” Id.
at 951. Furthermore, the court extensively distinguished its holding in Delaney from that of
Mitchell v. Superior Court, which was a civil case involving a claim of libel. Id. at 949–51. See
Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625, 632–34 (Cal. 1984). In Mitchell, the California
Supreme Court set forth a balancing test to resolve when a journalist must disclose
confidential information during the course of civil proceedings. Id. at 632–35. The test
devised by the court to be used in libel cases involved the contemplation of four factors: (i)
the nature of the proceeding; (ii) the desired information must go to the heart of the party’s
case, not simply relevant; (iii) alternative sources have been exhausted; and (iv) the truth of
the statements. Id.
115
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2(b). See Delaney, 789 P.2d at 942–44. California’s Constitution
was amended by a referendum vote in which the voters approved the measure. Id. See
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Because the citizens of California voted to incorporate California’s shield
law into the state’s Constitution, the court examined the intent of the
voters as opposed the legislature’s.116 The California Supreme Court has
recognized that the intent of the voters can be determined by looking to
the ballot argument supporting the proposed amendment.117 The ballot
argument supporting the California shield law emphasized the extreme
importance of the free flow of information to the public.118 The ballot
argument contended that the free flow of information depended on a
reporter’s ability to protect his sources.119 Justice Eagleson stated that “if
this right is not protected, the real losers will be all Californians who rely
on the unrestrained dissemination of information by the news media.”120
Supporters of the shield law argued that the amendment would require
the state’s judges to give greater protection to journalists before

CAL. CODE EVID. § 1070 (West 1984); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1986.1 (West 2001). There are
additional sources of the immunity that have been codified by California’s Legislature. See
CAL. CODE EVID. § 1070 (West 1984); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1986.1 (West 2001). Delaney,
789 P.2d at 939 n.5. These sections “are identical except for minor and insignificant
differences in wording” and the minimal legislative history of the provisions were mooted
when the constitutional amendment was passed by the voters. Id. See also, id. at 958–60
(Broussard, J., concurring) (commenting on the minimal legislative history of Section 1070
of the Code of Evidence and how it relates to Article 1, Section 2(b) of the California
Constitution). For an in-depth analysis of the development, amendments, and practical
scope of § 1070 of California’s Code of Evidence, see Rousso, supra note 108, at 351–57
(discussing the complexities of California’s three shield laws and how they relate to one
another); Alger, supra note 40, at 177–209 (same).
116
Delaney, 789 P.2d at 942. California’s shield law originally existed in the state’s code of
evidence and civil procedure; however, in 1980 the citizens of California amended the
State’s Constitution to incorporate California’s shield law. See id. at 942–43. In essence, the
passage of the amendment was similar to a recodification, but it also had the effect of
negating the legislative history supporting the original shield law. See id.
117
Id. at 942–43. The Delaney Court explained that although it was difficult to discern the
intent of the voters in adopting a measure to amend the State’s Constitution, an acceptable
and relevant source from which to ascertain the intent of the voters was the ballot
argument that accompanied the proposition which enacted the amendment. Id. at 943.
118
Id. at 943 n.13. The ballot argument outlined that the free flow of information was
being threatened due to certain exceptions which the California judiciary had carved out to
the shield law set out in Section 1070 of the Code of Evidence. Id. The ballot argument
premised this proposition on the fact that at least six reporters had been imprisoned for
refusing to reveal their confidential sources. Id.
119
Id. The ballot argument specifically stated that if a confidential source felt that a
reporter would be forced to break his confidentiality, then a source would simply not come
forward in the first place. Id. As such, the media’s usage of confidential sources was
critical to the gathering and dissemination of news and must be protected. Id.
120
Id. (emphasis omitted). The ballot argument also stressed that for democracy to work
the citizenry must be informed, and to do so required the presence of a free press to serve
as the watchdogs over our liberties and our nation. Id.
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compelling them to breach their confidentiality agreements with
sources.121
In sum, the state split illustrates that a newgatherer’s confidential
sources and information are protected in one jurisdiction, but not in
another.122
The inconsistencies among the states encumber the
newsgathering process and endanger all of the benefits that flow from an
informed society.123 Part III of this Note conducts a cost-benefit analysis
of the four approaches to shield laws and arrives at the conclusion that
the most practical and effective privilege to incorporate into a reporter’s
shield law is the blended privilege.124
III. ANALYSIS: THE TROUBLES AND TRIUMPHS OF BRANZBURG’S “BLANK
CHECK”
To determine which type of privilege states should incorporate into a
reporter’s shield law, Part III conducts a cost-benefit analysis of each
privilege.125 Section A analyzes the costs and benefits of the absolute

121
Id. The ballot argument disclaimed that there was already a shield law on the books,
Section 1070, which provided that reporters could not be held in contempt of court for
declining to disclose sources when compelled to do so. Id.
122
See Fargo, The Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential Information in States Without
Shield Laws, supra note 43, at 257–58 (stating that the state split was created because the
states enacted their reporter’s shield laws in an ad hoc manner). JOSEPH W. GLANNON,
EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: CIVIL PROCEDURE 168 (5th ed. 2007). Thus, in these federalists
tendencies illustrate a hallmark of the American legal system: “the law could be one thing
in Rome and another in Athens, if the legislature so declared it.” Id. This reflects the
fundamental precept that underlies this jurisdictional conflict: Indianans are different from
Floridians, just as New Yorkers are different from Californians. See id. The citizens of each
state have different concerns and challenges that they face; therefore, it is only logical that
the states tailor their approach accordingly so as to perpetuate the lives of its citizens. Id.
123
See Fargo, The Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential Information in States Without
Shield Laws, supra note 43, at 257–59.
124
See infra Part III (conducting a cost-benefit analysis of each type of privilege
implemented by state reporter’s shield laws).
125
See infra Part III (analyzing the different privileges by outlining the costs and benefits
associated with each methodology as derived from three criteria: the application of the
privilege, the parties and interests each privilege serves, and the public policy
considerations underlying each privilege). See Myrna S. Raeder, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
Unintended Consequences, and Evidentiary Policy: A Critique and a Rethinking of the Application
of a Single Set of Evidence Rules to Civil and Criminal Cases, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1585, 1585
(1998). Basically, a cost-benefit analysis is a technique that quantitatively evaluates
whether to follow a particular course of action or make a change in approaching an action,
method, or conduct. See id. Traditionally, the cost-benefit analysis is used in financial
decisions; however, it can be molded to study a vast array of situations and has been
widely used in the field of law and economics. See id. at 1599.
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privilege, while Section B examines the qualified privilege.126 Next,
Section C considers the blended privilege developed by New York and
the District of Columbia.127 Finally, Section D evaluates California’s
method that grants journalists immunity from being held in contempt.128
Part III concludes that, as a whole, the most practical and effective
privilege to incorporate into a reporter’s shield law is the blended
privilege.129
A. The Absolute Privilege: An Inherently Flawed Approach
This Section scrutinizes the costs and benefits of a shield law
granting newsgatherers an absolute privilege to resist compulsory
disclosure.130 First, this Section outlines the benefits created by the
implementation of an absolute privilege.131
Second, this Section
examines the costs associated with the absolute privilege.132 Finally, this
Section examines the costs and benefits of the absolute privilege and
concludes that the absolute privilege is inherently flawed.133
Three primary benefits flow from a reporter’s shield law that
incorporates an absolute privilege.134 The first is that the absolute
126
See infra Parts III.A–B (evaluating the costs and benefits associated with the absolute
privilege and the qualified privilege and determining that the costs of both privileges
outweigh their benefits).
127
See infra Part III.C (considering the costs and benefits of the blended approach and
finding that the benefits outweigh the costs).
128
See infra Part III.D (exploring the costs and benefits of granting immunity to
newsgatherers and concluding that this approach is altogether inadequate).
129
See infra Part III.E (determining that the blended privilege is the only privilege whose
benefits outweigh its costs, thus making the blended privilege an optimal methodology for
state shield laws).
130
See infra Part III.A (conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the absolute privilege by
espousing the positive and negative aspects of the absolute privilege).
131
See infra Part III.A (highlighting the benefits connected to the absolute privilege: (i)
combating the chilling effect compulsory disclosure has on the dissemination of news to
the public; (ii) directly protecting confidential sources and information, which allows the
media to be the citizenry’s watchdog over government action; and (iii) inhibiting the use of
fishing expeditions by litigants and government agencies).
132
See infra Part III.A (explaining the costs of the absolute privilege, which include
preventing otherwise material and admissible evidence from being introduced, inhibiting
law enforcement from fully performing their job, and hindering the efficiency,
effectiveness, and credibility of the judicial system).
133
See infra Part III.A (finding that the absolute privilege is inherently flawed because it
provides comprehensive protection for newsgatherers and confidential sources and
completely neglects the interests of litigants, government agencies and law enforcement,
and the judicial system).
134
See, e.g, infra notes 135–38, 140, 145 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits
stemming from an absolute privilege: combating the chilling effect; creating an educated
and informed citizenry; guaranteeing the free flow of information and the public’s right to
know; allowing professional journalists to adhere to the ethical obligations of
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privilege directly combats the chilling effect that compulsory disclosure
could have on the dissemination of news to the public.135 By tackling the
chilling effect head-on, the absolute privilege advances the public policy
concern of having information flow as freely as possible to the public.136
An unfettered press and unrestricted stream of information enhances the
public’s right to know and fosters an informed and educated public.137
Perhaps more significant, however, is that fighting the chilling effect
directly protects a reporter’s confidential source and confidential
information.138 Hence, by striving to prevent the chilling effect, the
newsgathering; having the press to serve as a the public’s watchdog; and, prohibiting
fishing expeditions).
135
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 714–15 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the newsgathering process would be severely impeded if confidential sources were left
unprotected, which would hasten the onset of the chilling effect). See Campagnolo, supra
note 1, at 452 (stressing that the chilling effect is not only a grave concern, but also a
probable likelihood if reporter’s shield laws do not ensure protection for confidential
sources); Fargo, The Year of Leaking Dangerously: Shadowy Sources, Jailed Journalists, and the
Uncertain Future of the Federal Journalist’s Privilege, supra note 33, at 1073 (stating that
protecting confidential sources helps to guarantee the free flow of information and the
public’s right to know by facilitating the quick collection and dissemination of news);
Papandrea, supra note 33, at 535–36 (the purpose of shield laws is to preserve the
dissemination of information into the public discourse); Weinberg, supra note 33, at 175
(stating that a reporter’s shield law assures the free flow of information to the public so that
citizens and leaders can make well-informed and educated decisions). See also supra notes
48, 54 (explaining the theory of the chilling effect: if source confidentiality was not
protected then sources would be reluctant to come forward and give newsworthy
information to journalists, which in turn could have adverse repercussions for the public).
136
E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-144 (1992) (stating that the legislative intent behind the
enactment of Nebraska’s absolute privilege was to guarantee the uninhibited flow of
information to the public, which was supported by the policy rationale that compelling
reporters to disclose sources runs contrary to the public interest). But see SENATE STAFF
ANALYSIS, supra note 93, at 6 (emphasizing that the legislative history supporting Florida’s
reporter’s shield law concluded that those jurisdictions that grant absolute privileges to
journalists as opposed to qualified privileges place too much emphasis on the argument
that the public has a right to know); supra note 96 and accompanying text (same).
137
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 712–14 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing for an absolute
privilege and reasoning that the fundamental right of the press to remain free from
government intrusion also means the citizenry has a substantial right to know the
information upon which the media reports). See also Meiklejohn, supra note 53, at 254
(stating that the First Amendment is designed to protect the people and freedom of the
press helps to secure this protection).
138
See Developments in the Law, supra note 35, at 1601 (stating that disclosure inhibits
confidential communications between journalists and their sources); GERPEN, supra note 35,
at 58–103 (arguing that compulsory disclosure, which the absolute privilege combats,
inhibits a source from communicating with a journalist and should be offered protection
since the source/journalist relationship is similar to other types of privileged relationships).
See also Dicke, supra note 41, at 1565 n.64 (noting that sheltering a source’s agreement of
confidentiality with a newsgatherer spawns a correlated benefit of the absolute privilege: it
lets members of the media act in accordance with their own canons of professional ethics);
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absolute privilege not only bolsters the interests of the press and the
public at large, but also secures a source’s confidentiality.139
A second and related benefit is that the absolute privilege allows the
media to be the public’s watchdog over the government.140 The
underlying theory is that the absolute privilege creates a truly free press
that acts as an unofficial check on the power and actions of the branches
of state and federal government.141 As Alexander Meiklejohn suggests, a
free press is essential to the Bill of Rights, and the Bill of Rights is
essential to our democratic values of freedom and independence because
open lines of communication and the quick dissemination of information
facilitate a republican form of government.142 Hence, this watchdog role
gives the media greater latitude to examine the actions of the
government, which provides the public with an extra measure of
security from improper government conduct.143
A final benefit of the absolute privilege is that it inhibits the use of
fishing expeditions by litigants and the government.144 The prevention
Fargo, The Year of Leaking Dangerously: Shadowy Sources, Jailed Journalists, and the Uncertain
Future of the Federal Journalist’s Privilege, supra note 33, at 1068 (discussing the journalistic
tradition of unabashedly protecting a source of information).
139
See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text (reasoning that the first benefit of the
absolute privilege is that it prevents the dissemination of news from being chilled because
it completely protects the interests of a newsgatherer’s confidential sources).
140
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 727 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (opining that the media performs
a critical function in our society by acting as the people’s watchdog over the government;
hence, the media is an unofficial check on the power of government). See also Alexander,
supra note 10, at 105–06 (tracing the history of the watchdog concept and explaining that
the notion of the media as the watchdog of the people is essential to the functioning of our
own self-government).
141
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 727–28 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stressing that the media’s
true role in America is not simply to keep citizens informed and educated about the news
and events, but to keep government, at all levels, as honest as possible so as to effectuate
the interests of the people).
142
See generally Meiklejohn, supra note 53, at 254 (arguing that the Bill of Rights
established that government exists because the people allow it to do so, therefore the
freedom the First Amendment guarantees the press is in furtherance of the Framers’
intentions for the people to govern themselves).
143
See Alexander, supra note 10, at 106–07, 109 (stating that one of the most valuable
services the media provides is facilitating the public’s right to know by acquiring
information and news that is typically otherwise inaccessible to the general public). See also
supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text (analyzing that a benefit of the absolute
privilege is that it allows the press to be the people’s watchdog, in order to ensure their
interests are secure).
144
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 744 n.34 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that fishing
expeditions cause injury to a reporter’s First Amendment rights because they are not based
on probable cause nor on any sufficient evidence that the reporter possesses information
would aid a litigant’s case). See Jones, supra note 4, at 626. The need to prevent the use of
fishing expeditions is critical, as is illustrated by a 2006 national survey conducted by
Professor RonNell Jones which found that in 2006 alone 761 responding news and media
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of fishing expeditions requires litigants to conduct their own discovery
and develop their own case, as opposed to simply relying on the
information and evidence gathered by journalists.145 Furthermore,
combating fishing expeditions not only prevents disclosure of the
information gained from a reporter’s source, but more importantly,
insulates the reporter’s own work product and thought process from
compulsory disclosure.146 Granting members of the press the ability to
maintain the secrecy of their own work product, which is more often
than not the target of these fishing expeditions, undoubtedly serves the
professional interests of the individual journalist.147 Nevertheless, the
general public also benefits from the absolute privilege’s prohibition on
fishing expeditions because it requires government officials to efficiently
allocate government resources and prohibits litigants from clogging the
courts with needless discovery requests.148
In sum, the policy considerations and reasoning supporting the
absolute privilege predominantly furthers the interests of the press.149

organizations reported that its newsgatherers had received nearly three thousand five
hundred subpoenas. Id. See also supra note 35 and accompanying text (explaining that a
recent trend has been that litigants and branches or agencies of the government attempting
to access a reporter’s confidential information do so in order to avoid taking the time to
develop their own case or investigation, thus relying entirely on the journalist to do the
work for them).
145
See Carter, supra note 35, at 183 (citing Boutrous & Stodder, supra note 35, at 23)
(stating that a one of the primary purposes of reporter’s shield laws and the privileges they
grant to journalists is to eliminate unnecessary subpoenas served upon newsgatherers by
litigants that are on fishing expeditions).
146
See, e.g., Alexander & Bush, supra note 15, at 215 (noting that newsgatherers are often
subpoenaed not just to testify in court, but to turn over any and all confidential and/or
unpublished information the journalist has accumulated); Alger, supra note 40, at 167
(highlighting that journalists tend to make particularly qualified and effective witnesses
because they are typically very well-organized and take copious notes of the interviews,
events, and stories that they cover).
147
See Dicke, supra note 41, at 1565 n.64 (citing AMERICAN NEWSPAPER GUILD, CODE OF
ETHICS (1934)) (discussing the professional responsibilities imposed on journalists and the
importance to the profession of a newsgatherer being able to maintain the confidentiality of
his work product).
148
See Carter, supra note 35, at 183 (citing Boutrous & Stodder, supra note 35, at 23)
(explaining that shield laws prevent fishing expeditions by litigants and government
officials and agencies by deterring unnecessary subpoena applications and discovery
requests). See also supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text (giving rise to the inference
that sources of information and the public at large are indirectly protected from the
absolute privilege’s direct insulation of newsgatherers from needless fishing expeditions).
149
See generally Part III.A (asserting that the benefits of the absolute privilege, taken as a
whole, show that the parties whose interests are by far best served under the absolute
privilege are those of the media and confidential sources).
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The general public benefits as well, albeit to a lesser extent.150 The
greatest benefit of the absolute privilege, however, is that it offers
complete protection for confidential sources.151
Nevertheless, the
implementation of a reporter’s shield law granting newsgatherers an
absolute privilege does not come without costs.152 The interests of three
parties are affected by the absolute privilege: individual litigants, the
government and its law enforcement agencies, and the judicial system.153
The first and most significant cost of the absolute privilege is that it
prevents litigants from obtaining information that could otherwise be
admitted as evidence in court.154 Some of the information and evidence
journalists acquire is not only advantageous to a litigant, but is often
critical to the merits and disposition of a litigant’s case.155 This is
particularly so in criminal proceedings where convictions or acquittals
depend upon the ability of the parties to access sensitive or confidential
information that a newsgatherer has in his possession.156 Similarly, this
See supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text (arguing that the interests of the public
and of confidential sources are furthered by the fact that the absolute privilege facilitates
the free flow of information to the public and precludes the chilling effect from occurring
by totally safeguarding the confidentiality of sources).
151
See, e.g., note 138 and accompanying text (describing that a significant aspect of the
absolute privilege is that it grants comprehensive protection to confidential sources, which
combats the collection and dissemination of news from being chilled, facilitates the free
flow of information, and serves the public’s right to know; all of which results in a welleducated citizenry that can make intelligent decisions).
152
See infra Part III.A (the three primary costs of the absolute privilege are as follows: (1)
it disregards the interests that litigants may have in accessing certain information; (2) it
impedes the ability of law enforcement to fully investigate criminal matters; and, (3) it
hinders the judicial process by not allowing courts to obtain evidence that would otherwise
be admissible).
153
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (holding that grand juries must have
the right to subpoena witnesses and hear every man’s evidence); Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178, 206 (1957) (concluding that congress has the power to require compulsory
disclosure of any information that falls within its legislative sphere). See also Papandrea,
supra note 33, at 535, 541–42 (stating that shield laws can aid in the prevention of crime by
giving law enforcement access to sensitive information).
154
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688 (emphasizing the importance that every man’s evidence
has in the administration of justice); State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 225 (Fla. 1998) (reasoning
that every man’s evidence is necessary for courts to be effective).
155
See In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d 1, 4, 10 (Ind. 1998) (ruling that Indiana’s reporter’s
shield law, which gives journalists an absolute privilege to resist compulsory disclosure,
prevented a defendant who was on trial for murder from accessing video tapes of an
interview he had with a television reporter about his crime before he had the opportunity
to consult with his attorney); WTHR-TV v. Milam, 690 N.E.2d 1174, 1175 (Ind. 1998)
(holding that Indiana’s reporter’s shield law precluded a criminal defendant’s ability to
discover video tapes that consisted of outtakes from a television interview the defendant
gave before the start of his trial).
156
See generally Papandrea, supra note 33, at 584–85 (explaining that in jurisdictions that
do not have absolute privileges, it is often very difficult, if not impossible, for a litigant in
150
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raises the concern that because a criminal defendant’s liberty is at stake,
he should have access to all of the evidence that could have a bearing
upon the disposition of his case.157 Thus, a considerable cost of the
absolute privilege is that it is inequitable because it divests the rights of
litigants to resort to the courts and have their cases decided on the basis
of all relevant and material evidence.158
A second detriment of the absolute privilege is that it hinders the
ability of government and law enforcement agencies to fully perform
their duties, by prohibiting access to certain information.159 This creates
evidentiary gaps that cause errors to occur in the criminal justice system,
which can lead to faulty convictions or acquittals.160 The growing need
for law enforcement and the courts to access relevant material that a
journalist may have in his possession is evidenced by the increasing
number of subpoenas issued to news and media organizations, which
was more than three thousand in 2006.161 This gives rise to a third and
costly detriment of the absolute privilege: it impedes the effectiveness

civil proceedings to access a newsgatherer’s confidential information because he must
show a compelling or overriding need for the information). See also supra note 73 and
accompanying text (explaining that parties in civil proceedings typically cannot divest a
journalist’s protection from compulsory disclosure even in jurisdictions not employing the
absolute privilege, because litigants are often required to satisfy enhanced burdens of
proof).
157
See Schmid, supra note 71, at 1473 (discussing the detrimental effect a criminal
defendant faces in court, particularly in federal court, if he is not allowed to access certain
information or evidence in a journalist’s possession simply because of a state’s reporter’s
shield law).
158
See supra notes 154–57 (explaining a significant cost of the absolute privilege is its
rigidity in that a litigant, whether civil or criminal, faces the simple truth that no matter
how much need he may have for obtaining information in a journalist’s possession, a
reporter’s shield law that incorporates an absolute privilege will bar his every attempt to
access that information).
159
See Papandrea, supra note 33, at 541–43 (noting that reporter’s shield laws can both
help law enforcement with crime prevention and undercut their efforts to do so,
particularly those shield laws that incorporate the use of an absolute privilege, because the
absolute privilege acts as a barrier to all information that could potentially aid law
enforcement).
160
See Peter Meyer, BALCO, the Steroids Scandal, and What the Already Fragile Secrecy of
Federal Grand Juries Means to the Debate Over a Potential Federal Media Shield Law, 83 IND. L.J.
1671, 1672 (2008) (discussing that shield laws can prevent a grand jury, prosecutor, or
defendant from accessing information in a reporter’s possession that would otherwise be
discoverable; thus, the structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence could possibly cause a
state reporter’s shield law to be outcome-determinative).
161
See Jones, supra note 4, at 626 (discussing an extensive national survey conducted in
2006 of over seven hundred news and media organizations pertaining to the growing
number of subpoenas being issued to newsgatherers).
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and credibility of the justice system.162 As more subpoenas are requested
and issued, the judicial process slows down because more resources are
allocated to applying for, investigating, and granting subpoenas and
court orders requesting a newsgatherer to disclose information.163 Even
more troubling, as the interests of reporters are given more deference,
the public’s confidence in the judicial process begins to diminish, which
causes the judicial system to lose its reliability.164 Therefore, two serious
costs of the absolute privilege are that it places an undue burden on law
enforcement and puts the trustworthiness of our judicial system in
peril.165
The cost-benefit analysis of the absolute privilege shows that the
costs of the absolute privilege outweigh its benefits.166 This result is
premised on the finding that the absolute privilege places emphasis
solely on the interests of the media, and does not accommodate litigants,
law enforcement, or the court system.167 In effect, the absolute privilege
makes the rights and interests of litigants and the government
subordinate to those of the press.168 The preeminent benefit of the
absolute privilege is that it prevents the dissemination of news from
162
See SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 93, at 5–6 (Fla. 1998), available at
http://www.flsenate.gov/ data/session/1998/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/SB0150.go.pdf
(suggesting that an absolute privilege detrimentally affects the judicial system because the
scope of the privilege is unclear and causes more judicial resources to be allocated to
resolving disputes).
163
See Jones, supra note 4, at 626–27 (emphasizing that the thousands of subpoena
requests and applications for reporters to divulge certain information that flood the court
system each year place a heavy burden on scarce judicial resources).
164
See supra notes 160, 162–163 (stating that placing too much weight on protecting the
media and confidential sources has the adverse effect of jeopardizing the integrity of the
judicial system).
165
See supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text (determining that the absolute
privilege’s inflexible deference to the media and confidential sources hinders law
enforcement efforts to investigate crimes and negatively affects the judicial system).
166
See infra notes 167–71 (concluding that the costs of the absolute privilege outweigh its
benefits because the costs demonstrate that the absolute privilege is stubbornly
uncompromising in the way it prefers the interests of the media and confidential sources
over those of litigants, law enforcement, government agencies, and the courts).
167
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (emphasizing the importance that
every man’s evidence has in the administration of justice and the need for litigants,
especially a criminal defendant, to be able to access information that goes to the heart of his
case); State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 225 (Fla. 1998) (reasoning that every man’s evidence is
essential for the judicial process to be effective). See also supra note 154 and accompanying
text (observing that a detrimental cost of the absolute privilege is that it excludes otherwise
admissible evidence from discovery and introduction at trial).
168
See Sherwin, supra note 36, at 139 (citing DONALD M. GILLMOR ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS
OF MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 121 (1996)) (discussing the natural tension that exists
between journalists, confidential sources, litigants, law enforcement, and the judicial
system).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss1/6

Faucette: Your Secret's Safe with Me…or So You Think: How States Have Cash

2009]

Your Secret’s Safe With Me

219

being chilled, by guaranteeing protection for a reporter’s confidential
sources, yet the other benefits come at too great a cost.169 Although the
press must be free, the rights that litigants and the government have to
access critical information and evidence are at the very least equal to
those of the media.170 Hence, the absolute privilege, standing alone, is an
inherently flawed approach to reporter’s shield laws.171
B. The Qualified Privilege: Reasonable, But Not Entirely Practical
This Section evaluates the costs and benefits that follow the
implementation of a qualified privilege in a reporter’s shield law.172 This
Section begins by highlighting the benefits of the qualified privilege.173
Next, this Section explores the costs of the qualified privilege.174 Finally,
this Section weighs the costs and benefits of the qualified privilege and
determines that the qualified privilege is reasonable, but not entirely
practical in its application.175
The benefits of the qualified privilege are three-fold: (1) it advances
the fair and equitable administration of justice; (2) it cuts down the
transaction costs associated with litigation; and (3) it makes the courts
operate more efficiently and effectively.176 First, the qualified privilege
addresses the public policy concern of ensuring the fair and equitable

See infra note 170 (concluding that the tension between the media, confidential
sources, litigants, government and law enforcement agencies, and courts demands a less
rigid approach than the absolute privilege).
170
See generally Davis, 720 So. 2d at 227–28 (emphasizing that under the absolute
privilege, it would not make a difference whether a reporter’s confidential information was
material to a litigant’s case or could have a bearing on the outcome of a case, it is always
excluded from discovery and this result is inequitable and unfair).
171
See supra note 170 (emphasizing that the absolute privilege is inherently flawed
because it does not accommodate the needs and interest of all parties concerned, rather it
clearly gives preference to the interests of the media and confidential sources).
172
See infra Part III.B (examining the costs and benefits of the qualified privilege).
173
See infra Part III.B (outlining and analyzing the benefits of the qualified privilege).
174
See infra Part III.B (identifying and studying the costs of the qualified privilege).
175
See infra Part III.B (weighing the costs and benefits of the qualified privilege and
determining the qualified privilege is a more reasonable approach than the absolute
privilege, but causes impractical and unacceptable results in certain situations).
176
See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 744, 747–48 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the fairness of the judicial process demands that a reporter’s
privilege, whether found under common law or codified, must account for the interests of
all parties to the litigation on a case-by-case basis); SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 93,
at 1, 5 (explaining that a reporter’s shield law with a qualified privilege decreases the
transaction costs of litigation, which, in turn, reduces the amount of trials, hearings,
motions, and discovery and frees judicial resources, which allows the courts to operate
more efficiently).
169
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administration of justice.177 The qualified privilege achieves this goal
because it strikes a balance between the competing interests of the
media, the litigants, and the government.178 The qualified privilege
tends, however, to favor a newsgatherer’s interest in maintaining
confidentiality because the party attempting to obtain the information
must meet a high burden of proof in order for a court to force the
revelation of the newsgatherer’s confidential information.179 Thus, by
balancing the interests of the parties, the qualified privilege arrives at a
result that is fair and equitable because it gives litigants the opportunity
to access evidence in a journalist’s possession.180
A second benefit is that the qualified privilege reduces the
transaction costs of litigation to litigants and to news organizations as
well.181 Transaction costs are reduced because the qualified privilege
offers a framework for analyzing when compelled disclosure is likely to
be authorized by a court.182 The result is a considerable reduction in the

177
See generally Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 744, 747–48 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stressing the
proper inquiry should be to balance the interests of all parties on a case-by-case basis in
order to determine whether to divest a newsgatherer’s privilege to resist compelled
disclosure).
178
See FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998) (providing a qualified privilege that requires the
moving party to show the confidential information subpoenaed to be material to his claim,
unavailable from other reasonable means, and the movant has a compelling need for the
information); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907 (West 1985) (granting journalists a qualified
privilege, but, in contrast to the Florida shield law, only requiring the movant to show the
information was not a matter of secrecy, all other resources for the information had been
exhausted, and disclosure was necessary to protect the public interest involved in the case,
rather than the litigant) (emphasis added). But see N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (McKinney
1996) (modified qualified privilege requiring proof that the need for the reporter’s
information “(i) is highly material and relevant; (ii) is critical or necessary to the
maintenance of a party’s claim, defense or proof of an issue material thereto; and (iii) is not
obtainable from any alternative source”; hence, no personal need nor public interest must
be served under New York’s modified qualified privilege).
179
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (requiring the litigant to show a compelling need); D.C.
CODE § 16-4703 (1999) (although adopting a blended privilege, the modified qualified
privilege encapsulated in the District of Columbia’s blended privilege requires the showing
of an overriding public interest); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907 (same).
180
See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text (elucidating that the underlying notion
of fairness that permeates the qualified privilege, by giving litigants or government
agencies the opportunity to access a journalist’s confidential information, including the
identity of a confidential source, makes the qualified privilege a more equitable approach
than the absolute privilege).
181
See infra notes 182–83 (explaining that the qualified privilege reduces the transaction
costs of litigation by adding stability to the analytical framework of a reporter’s shield law,
which brings about a corresponding drop in the number of discovery and subpoena
requests, hearings, court filings, and attorneys fees).
182
E.g., SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 93, at 1, 5 (stating that the legislative history
supporting Florida’s qualified privilege emphasized the belief that the adoption of a
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number of subpoenas seeking the discovery of a journalist’s information
or source and a corresponding drop in the transaction costs of the
litigation.183 The litigants are not the only ones that benefit from the
reduced transaction costs, because as costs to the parties decrease, so too
do the judicial resources allocated to managing the case.184 In turn, this
creates a third benefit of the qualified privilege: judicial economy and
effectiveness.185 Hence, the qualified privilege creates judicial economy
by trimming down the number of subpoenas issued by a court, which
frees up judicial resources and allows the courts to work more efficiently
and economically.186
As a whole, the principal benefit of the qualified privilege is that it
produces fair and equitable administration of justice by offering litigants
and the government an opportunity to discover information and
evidence that is critical to a case or investigation.187 Also, the qualified
privilege gives considerable deference and protection to a reporter’s
ability to keep his information and sources confidential by requiring an
exacting standard to be met before disclosure is compelled.188 Moreover,
the qualified privilege’s analytical framework causes a reduction in the
transaction costs of litigation and creates greater judicial efficiency and
judicial economy.189

qualified privilege would reduce the number of subpoenas filed, which would then drive
down transaction costs associated with litigation).
183
Id. at 1–5 (explaining that added predictability would cause a decrease in the number
of subpoenas issued by courts and would thus reduce other transaction costs of litigation
such as attorney’s fees, court costs, and filing fees).
184
Id. at 5 (noting that the Florida Legislature found further support for adopting a
qualified privilege into the state’s reporter’s shield law because as transaction costs are
reduced for litigants there is an analogous drop in the workload of the courts, which frees
judicial resources to be allocated elsewhere).
185
See id. at 1, 5 (stating that the qualified privilege leads to increased efficiency in the
judicial system because less judicial resources would have to be spent on managing cases
pertaining to a state’s reporter’s shield law).
186
See id.
187
See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text (explaining that a constructive aspect of
the qualified privilege is that it takes into account the needs and interests of all parties and
lets litigants and government agencies obtain certain information in a journalist’s
possession if the circumstances so require).
188
E.g., supra note 179 and accompanying text (emphasizing that although the qualified
privilege gives litigants the opportunity to divest the journalist’s privilege there is still
considerable deference granted to a journalist’s privilege, which is evident in the fact that
the qualified privilege requires a moving party to meet a high burden of proof before a
court will deprive a newsgatherer of his right to maintain the confidentiality of information
and sources).
189
See supra notes 181–86 and accompanying text (stating that other benefits of the
qualified privilege include reduced transaction costs for litigants which subsequently leads
to a more efficient court system).
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On the other hand, two costs follow the qualified privilege.190 The
first and most glaring cost of the qualified privilege is that it imperils a
journalist’s ability to maintain the confidentiality of his sources.191 A
terrible flaw of the qualified privilege is that it neglects the interests of a
critical party in the newsgathering and dissemination process: the
confidential source.192 This stems from the fact that the qualified
privilege classifies the identity of a reporter’s confidential source as
confidential information, which is subject to compulsory disclosure in
certain circumstances.193 The side effect of not granting any protection to
confidential sources is the perpetuation of the chilling effect.194 Once the
chilling effect is implicated, then so is the public’s interest in the
dissemination of news and information, albeit indirectly.195 Therefore,
the two overarching costs of the qualified privilege are that it offers
inadequate protection for confidential sources and impinges on the free
flow of information.196

See infra notes 191–96 (describing the two costs of the qualified privilege, which are
that it offers minimal protection to confidential sources and limits the free flow of
information to the public which could result in the public being less informed).
191
See Developments in the Law, supra note 35, at 1601 (stating that disclosure, and even the
possibility of disclosure, inhibits the communication of news from confidential sources to
journalists); Fargo, The Year of Leaking Dangerously: Shadowy Sources, Jailed Journalists, and
the Uncertain Future of the Federal Journalist’s Privilege, supra note 33, at 1068 (stressing the
importance of the journalistic tradition of defending a source of information who wishes to
remain anonymous).
192
See Alexander, supra note 10, at 102 (stating that the importance of confidential sources
and allowing journalists to maintain their confidentiality is imperative to the
newsgathering and dissemination process).
193
See supra Part II.C.3.b (no qualified privilege that was surveyed has a specific
provision protecting the ability of journalists to maintain the confidentiality of their
sources). For further discussion, see infra Part III.C (discussing the importance of the
blended approach’s invocation of a separate provision into the privilege, providing for the
confidentiality of the source).
194
See, e.g., Laura R. Handman, Protection of Confidential Sources: A Moral, Legal, and Civic
Duty, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 573, 583 (2005) (arguing that if a journalist’s
confidential sources are left unprotected then the newsgathering process would be chilled,
and, subsequently, there would be a drop in the amount of news coverage because of the
reluctance of sources to come forward and speak to reporters).
195
E.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 712–15 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(reasoning that the fundamental right of the press to remain free from government
intrusion means the citizenry has a substantial right to know the information upon which
the media reports, hence the public has a legitimate interest in the dissemination of news
being chilled).
196
See supra notes 190–95 and accompanying text (determining that the drawbacks of the
qualified privilege are that it offers nominal protection for confidential sources which can
lead to the dissemination of news being chilled, and subsequently, the public’s right to
know will be infringed).
190
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The cost-benefit analysis reveals that the qualified privilege strikes
an appropriate balance between the rights and interests of the litigants,
the government, and the press; however, it leaves out the interests of two
critical parties: confidential sources and the general public.197 The
potential threat of the chilling effect is too great a cost to justify the
qualified privilege.198 Hence, a qualified privilege, by itself, is reasonable
but does not yield the most practical results because it imperils the
interests of confidential sources and the public.199
C. The Blended Privilege: A Model of Pragmatism
This Section explores the blended approach that has been adopted
by New York and the District of Columbia.200 First, this Section
identifies the benefits created by a blended privilege.201 Next, this
Section surveys the costs connected to the blended privilege.202 Lastly,
this Section analyzes the costs and benefits of the blended privilege and
concludes that the benefits vastly outweigh the costs.203
There are two benefits of the blended privilege.204 First, the blended
privilege completely insulates reporters from being compelled to
disclose the identity of confidential sources, which prevents the chilling
effect from dissuading the gathering and dissemination of news.205
197
See supra notes 191–96 and accompanying text (explaining that although the benefits
of the qualified privilege are numerous, yet they are stymied by the lack of protection for
sources which could cause the gathering and dissemination of news to be chilled).
198
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 715 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stressing that a lack of protection
for the media will directly impact the public’s right to know and the free flow of
information to the public). See Handman, supra note 194, at 585–86 (stating that the chilling
effect is a very real possibility if the ability of journalists to protect and keep the confidence
of sources is infringed or abrogated).
199
See supra Part III.B (concluding from the cost-benefit analysis that even though the
qualified privilege is more desirable than the absolute privilege, the costs of the qualified
privilege trump the benefits).
200
See infra Part III.C (conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the blended privilege, which
combines portions from the absolute privilege and qualified privilege).
201
See infra Part III.C (outlining the benefits of the blended privilege).
202
See infra Part III.C (discussing the costs of the blended privilege).
203
See infra Part III.C (analyzing the costs and benefits of the blended privilege and
finding that the benefits of the blended privilege vastly prevail over the costs).
204
See infra Part III.C (explaining that the first benefit of the blended privilege is that it
completely insulates confidential sources, which prevents the chilling effect from
occurring; and, secondly, the blended privilege accounts for the interests that litigants, the
government, and the judicial system have in obtaining relevant and material evidence and
information).
205
E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-4703 (1999); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAWS § 79-H (McKinney 1996). See
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726–29 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stressing the
important role of confidential sources in the newsgathering process and reasoning that
leaving confidential sources unprotected would chill the dissemination of news to the
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Second, the blended approach implements a modified qualified privilege
that gives litigants, the government, and the judicial system the
opportunity to access material information and evidence.206 With respect
to the first benefit of the blended privilege, and as previously noted, an
overriding cost of the absolute privilege is that it gives too much
deference to newsgatherers and elevates their interests above those of
other parties, such as litigants, law enforcement, and the courts.207 A
substantial benefit of the blended approach is that it recognizes this error
and compensates for it by vesting newsgatherers with the ability to
refuse to disclose the identity of a confidential source.208 In contrast to
this approach, the qualified privilege does not grant any protection
whatsoever to confidential sources.209 Thus, one of the blended
approach’s primary benefits is that it gives absolute protection for
journalists to maintain the confidentiality of sources of their
information.210

public). See also Developments in the Law, supra note 35, at 1601 (iterating that the possibility
of disclosure of a confidential source’s identity retards communications between journalists
and sources); supra notes 138–39, 192–94 and accompanying text (explaining that the
primary benefit of the absolute privilege is that the absolute privilege encompasses
protection for a reporter’s confidential information, including the identity of confidential
sources, and that the most costly flaw of the qualified privilege is that it does not grant
enough protection to confidential sources).
206
See D.C. CODE § 16-4703 (adopting in its reporter’s shield law a modified qualified
privilege that requires a moving party demonstrate the information at issue is relevant to
his case, cannot be obtained through other reasonable means, and there is an overriding
need for disclosure of the information); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (enacting a modified
qualified privilege that, in order for a divestment of the privilege to occur, requires a
litigant to show the information in the reporter’s possession is highly material, critical or
necessary to his claim, and cannot be obtained from alternative sources). See also supra
notes 178–80 and accompanying text (illustrating the imperative need for reporter’s shield
laws to grant some form of qualified privilege to give those litigants and government
agencies who legitimately need information a journalist has in his possession a chance to
obtain the evidence).
207
See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text (discussing the prevailing cost of the
absolute privilege which is its impractical protection for newsgatherers and sources alone,
and concluding that by not even considering the interests of individual litigants, the
government, and the courts the absolute privilege, by itself is ineffective).
208
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-4703 (incorporating an absolute privilege for journalists to
resist compulsory disclosure of confidential sources); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (same).
209
See FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998) (providing a qualified privilege for a journalist’s
confidential information, but with no express provision accommodating the interests of
confidential sources); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907 (1985) (same).
210
See supra notes 205, 208–09 and accompanying text (arguing that a significant benefit
of the blended privilege is that it expressly accommodates the interests of confidential
sources and provides for their absolute protection, which is necessary to ensure the
continuous flow of news and information to the public).
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Regarding the second benefit of the blended privilege (the
incorporation of a modified qualified privilege), a particularly
compelling aspect of the qualified privilege is that it accounts for the
interests that litigants, the government, and the judicial system have in
obtaining relevant evidence and information from newsgatherers.211 The
blended approach properly tailors the use of the qualified privilege to
reach information that could potentially be used as evidence.212 In
addition, the blended privilege implements an appropriate balancing test
to determine when a reporter’s right to maintain his confidential
information should be divested.213 Moreover, the balancing of interests
required by the modified qualified privilege assures the interests of the
press are not disregarded or belittled.214 Thus, the blended approach’s
modified qualified privilege that provides for compulsory disclosure of a
newsgatherer’s confidential or unpublished information in certain
circumstances is necessary for a shield law to function effectively.215
In contrast to the benefits, the sole cost of the blended privilege is
that it prevents pure freedom of the press because a journalist could be
compelled to disclose unpublished or confidential information if a
movant meets his burden of proof.216
Nevertheless, acceptable
211
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-4703 (incorporating a modified qualified privilege that lays
out a balance test the requirements of which a movant must satisfy before a journalist’s
qualified privilege will be divested); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (same).
212
See, e.g., infra note 213 and accompanying text (stating that New York and the District
of Columbia adopted a modified qualified privilege with a balancing test to determine
when a litigant can access or discover information or evidence a journalist has in his
possession).
213
See supra note 211 and accompanying text (emphasizing that a key aspect of the
blended privilege is that it is flexible in that it grants litigants the opportunity to obtain a
journalist’s confidential information, yet unwavering in its protection for confidential
sources).
214
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (requiring the litigant to show a compelling need for the
information or evidence for discovery to be compelled); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907
(requiring the presence of an overriding public interest); D.C. CODE § 16-4703 (although
adopting a blended privilege, the modified qualified privilege encapsulated in the District
of Columbia’s blended privilege requires the showing of an overriding public interest). See
also note 179 and accompanying text (stating that even though a qualified privilege and
even the modified qualified privilege that is incorporated into the blended privilege give
litigants the chance to divest a reporter’s confidential information, these litigants must
satisfy a heavy burden of proof to compel discovery of the evidence; therefore, there exists
a strong presumption in favor of allowing a journalist to maintain the confidentiality of
certain information).
215
See supra notes 211–14 and accompanying text (stating that a considerable benefit of
the blended privilege is that it gives litigants the opportunity to discover a newsgatherer’s
confidential information).
216
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 712–15 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stressing
that an absolute privilege was necessary to protect reporters because it was a command of
the First Amendment and essential to the concept of liberty under the Bill of Rights).
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safeguards are in place that prohibit a pervasive intrusion into the
media’s freedom.217 In all actuality, the press is still free to report
whatever news it deems appropriate, and reporters are allowed to
maintain the confidentiality of their sources.218 Therefore, the cost of the
blended privilege is fairly minimal.219
The foregoing cost-benefit analysis of the blended privilege
illustrates that its benefits outweigh its costs.220 The blended approach
offers absolute protection for sources and gives consideration to the
interests of the newsgatherer, the litigant, and the government.221 Thus,
the blended privilege provides an advantage that the other types of
shield laws do not: it takes into account the interests of all parties who
could be affected by court-ordered disclosure of confidential
information.222 The only detriment of the blended approach is that it
takes away some of the freedom enjoyed by members of the media.223
This is remedied, however, by the fact that the blended privilege targets
the disclosure only of information, as opposed to sources, and gives
substantial deference to a reporter’s autonomy by requiring litigants to

217
See, e.g., supra note 179 and accompanying text (emphasizing that sufficient protection
for the interests of journalists is evidenced by the elevated burden of proof that is required
to be met before any form of the qualified privilege is divested).
218
See supra notes 214, 217 (noting that the only concession which journalists must make
under the modified qualified privilege is that they may be required to disclose certain
information in specific situations, particularly when a criminal defendant shows a
compelling or substantially important need for the information).
219
See supra notes 216–18 and accompanying text (describing that the single cost of the
blended privilege, which is that it slightly infringes on a reporter’s confidentiality, is only
nominal at best).
220
See infra notes 221–25 and accompanying text (concluding that the blended privilege
combines the most beneficial aspects of the absolute privilege and qualified privilege,
which, in turn, reduces the negative impact of the blended privilege).
221
See, e.g., supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text (outlining the primary benefits of
the blended privilege to be that it protects the interests of confidential sources while at the
same time balancing the interests of journalists, litigants, government and law enforcement
agencies, and the courts).
222
See supra notes 211–15 and accompanying text (discussing how the blended privilege
adopts the principal benefit of the qualified privilege in that it balances the rights and
interests of the parties concerned in each particular situation) (emphasis added).
223
See supra notes 216–18 and accompanying text (detailing the only cost of the blended
privilege: at times it can impair a reporter’s ability to maintain the confidentiality of
information and evidence).
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meet a high burden to trigger compulsory disclosure.224 Hence, the
benefits of the blended approach clearly outweigh the costs.225
D. Immunity: A Unique Approach With Generic Results
The final Section of Part III considers California’s approach of
granting newsgatherers immunity from being held in contempt.226 This
Section explores how California’s method is similar to the blended
approach that has been enacted by New York and the District of
Columbia.227 It concludes, however, that granting immunity from
contempt is inadequate because it actually offers less protection for
members of the media and confidential sources than the absolute
privilege, qualified privilege, or blended privilege.228
California’s shield law grants newsgatherers immunity from being
held in contempt for refusing to disclose their sources and
information.229 The California Supreme Court carved out an exception
that allows the disclosure of a reporter’s unpublished information if the
requirements of a balancing test are met.230 The balancing test adopted
by the California Supreme Court examines:
“(a) Whether the
See, e.g., supra note 214 and accompanying text (explaining that even though the
interests of journalists are diminished by the blended privilege their interests are not
wholly disregarded due to the enhanced burdens of proof that movants must satisfy when
trying to compel discovery of confidential information).
225
See supra notes 220–24 and accompanying text (concluding that the benefits of the
blended privilege outweigh the costs because it incorporates the best that the absolute
privilege and qualified privilege have to offer: it protects confidential sources and balances
the rights of all parties concerned to determine whether to compel disclosure).
226
See infra Part III.D (conducting an analysis of the costs and benefits of California’s
approach to a reporter’s shield law: granting immunity from contempt to newsgatherers
for refusing to comply with court-ordered disclosure or subpoenas).
227
See infra Part III.D (noting that the theory behind California’s grant of immunity to
journalists is comparable to the methodology of the blended privilege because immunity
acts in a similar manner to the blended privilege’s absolute protection for confidential
sources).
228
See infra Part III.D (explaining that although immunity and the blended privilege are
similar, immunity actually grants less protection to confidential sources because there is no
express provision addressing the interests of confidential sources, and immunity does not
proscribe other judicial sanctions from being imposed against a reporter for failure to
comply with a subpoena).
229
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (granting a newsgatherer immunity from being held in
contempt for refusing to disclose any information, whether confidential or not, or the
identity of any confidential source). See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1993) (providing the
same privilege); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1986.1 (West 2001) (same).
230
See Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 948–49 (Cal. 1990) (reasoning that
although immunity was critical to a reporter, litigants, particularly criminal defendants and
prosecutors, as well as law enforcement agencies should be able to obtain evidence if a
sufficient need was demonstrated).
224
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unpublished information is confidential or sensitive . . . (b) The interests
sought to be protected by the shield law . . . (c) The importance of the
information to the criminal defendant . . . [and] (d) Whether there is an
alternative source for the unpublished information.”231 In essence, the
application of California’s reporter’s shield law is similar to the blended
approach championed by New York and the District of Columbia.232
California’s approach is unsuitable, however, because immunity actually
offers less protection to newsgatherers than an absolute privilege or the
absolute provision present in the blended privilege.233 A reporter does
not have to be held in contempt for a judge to sanction the reporter.234
Thus, the sole cost of granting immunity to journalists is that it offers less
protection to newsgatherers and their sources than any other privilege,
which renders California’s approach entirely unacceptable.235

231
Id. at 949–50 (emphasis omitted). See also Part III.B (discussing the benefits and costs
of the qualified privilege, and emphasizing the equity and fairness principles advanced by
the qualified privilege).
232
Compare CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2, and Delaney, 789 P.2d at 949–51 (granting immunity
from contempt and implementing a qualified privilege developed by the California
Supreme Court), with D.C. CODE § 16-4703 (1992), and N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H
(McKinney 1996) (granting an absolute privilege for reporter’s to keep confidential the
identity of their sources and also providing a qualified privilege for disclosing a reporter’s
confidential information).
233
See New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 796 P.2d 811, 817–18 (Cal. 1990)
(emphasizing that just because California’s reporter’s shield law grants a journalist
immunity does not mean that a court is forbidden from imposing other sanctions in order
to coerce a reporter’s compliance with a subpoena or court-ordered testimony). See also
Rousso, supra note 108, at 353–54 (noting that California’s shield law grants immunity to
members of the media by preventing a journalist from being prosecuted for failing to
comply with a subpoena or court order requiring him to testify about confidential sources
or information, but says nothing about other forms of punishment that a court could
impose upon a journalist to compel disclosure or testimony).
234
See New York Times, 796 P.2d 811 at 817–18 (Cal. 1984) (stating that courts possess
forms of punishment other than simply a finding of contempt and incarceration). See also
Savage, supra note 41, at 8 (reporting that in response to a journalist’s refusal to comply
with a subpoena and disclose a confidential source, a federal judge ordered the journalist to
pay, without any help from her employer, family, or friends, a daily fine of five hundred
dollars until she complied with the subpoena).
235
See supra notes 229–234 and accompanying text (determining that granting
newsgatherers immunity from being held in contempt for noncompliance with a subpoena
is a wholly inappropriate methodology because it not only offers no protection to
confidential sources, but it does not even adequately insulate journalists from sanctions
other than being held in contempt or incarcerated).
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E. Results of the Cost-Benefit Analysis
In summation, a set of principles may be drawn from the foregoing
cost-benefit analyses.236 First, to be viable, a reporter’s shield law must
protect confidential sources by granting newsgatherers an absolute
privilege to maintain the confidentiality of the source’s identity.237
Second, it is essential for a shield law to provide some form of qualified
privilege in order to balance the rights and interests of all parties
concerned so as to arrive at a fair and equitable result.238 Third, the
absolute privilege and qualified privilege are inadequate models
standing alone, but when the two are combined by the blended privilege,
they become quite effective.239 To illustrate these principles, Part IV of
this Note contributes an application of these findings by presenting a
model reporter’s shield law.240
IV. A RESOLUTION: THE NEWSGATHERER’S PROTECTION ACT
This Note’s cost-benefit analysis demonstrates that the blended
approach is the optimal privilege to be incorporated into a reporter’s
shield law. Thus, any reporter’s shield law that is adopted should
include the use of a blended privilege. Part IV of this Note contributes a
model reporter’s shield law, entitled “The Newsgatherer’s Protection
Act,” which implements a blended privilege and provides full
commentary.

See infra notes 237–39 and accompanying text (drawing three overarching principles
from the cost-benefit analysis conducted in Part III: a reporter’s shield law must protect
confidential sources, incorporate a form of qualified privilege to give a litigant the
opportunity to access certain information if he has a sufficient need, and the absolute
privilege and qualified privilege are inadequate by themselves but very effective if
combined).
237
See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text (stressing that the primary benefit of
the absolute privilege is that it grants comprehensive protection to confidential sources and
is a feature that any reporter’s shield law should incorporate).
238
See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text (explaining that the principle benefit of
any form of qualified privilege is that it promotes equity and fairness to all parties
concerned).
239
See supra Part III.C (concluding that the blended privilege adopted by the District of
Columbia and New York is the most effective and practical approach to reporter’s shield
laws because it combines the most desirable aspects of the absolute privilege and the
qualified privilege).
240
See infra Part IV (contributing a model reporter’s shield law that incorporates the
blended privilege).
236
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A. The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act - Section 1: Scope
This Section is intended to define the class of persons falling
under the protection of this Act. Any person associated,
employed, or regularly engaged, connected or affiliated for
personal, pecuniary, or financial gain with a newspaper or
media organiation that publishes or broadcasts at regular
intervals or has a general circulation shall fall under the
protection of this Act.241
Commentary
The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act incorporates a broad definition of
newsgatherer to protect not simply the journalist, but also editors,
photographers, administrators, researchers, fact-checkers, and other
support staff affiliated with either print or broadcast media
organizations.242 The broad scope of the Act includes such journalists as
e-journalists and bloggers, as long as they are associated, employed, or
regularly engaged, connected, or affiliated with a news or media
organization.243 More importantly, however, by widening the scope of
The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act, confidential sources are
encompassed under the Act’s large umbrella of protection because they
are “associated . . . regularly engaged, connected, or affiliated” with a
protected organization or person.244

241
The proposed model statute this Note contributes, both the text and commentary, is
the product of the author’s work and is not an adaptation of any one particular reporter’s
shield law, but is based on the complete range of the topics discussed and analyzed by this
Note. See FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998) (employing a broad definition of who is a journalist
for the purposes of the state’s reporter’s shield law); IND. CODE § 34-46-4-1 (1998) (same);
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (McKinney 1996) (same). See also, supra note 91 (stating the
Florida definition of journalist setting forth broad language to extend the shield law’s
protection anyone who is in any way connected with a news organization); supra note 75
(giving the Indiana definition of journalist which includes that any news or media
organization be licensed by the state); supra note 102 (outlining the New York shield law
which defines the terms news or media organization as opposed to a journalist).
242
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (including a broader scope of protection the shield law to
those who are support staff).
243
See supra note 77 and accompanying text (explaining that independent journalists such
as bloggers and e-journalists are left unprotected by state reporter’s shield laws because
they are unaffiliated with any legitimate or official news organization).
244
The quoted material is an excerpt from Section 1 of The Newsgatherer’s Protection
Act. See supra Part III.A; note 237 and accompanying text (concluding from the cost-benefit
analysis that protection for confidential sources is essential to the gathering and
dissemination of news and information and, therefore, it is necessary for a reporter’s shield
law to guard the interests of confidential sources).
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B. The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act - Section 2: Absolute Privilege for
Sources
Section 2 of this act is intended to grant any organization or
individual falling under Section 1 of this Act an absolute
privilege to keep confidential the identity of confidential
sources. No organization or person falling under Section 1 of
this Act shall be compelled to disclose in any legal or
investigatory proceeding the identity, including any
identifying characteristic or description, of any source of news
or information who has entered into an agreement of
confidentiality with the organization or person falling under
Section 1. This absolute privilege applies whether the news or
information obtained from the confidential source goes
published or unpublished or whether the form of the news or
information is given in written, verbal, recorded,
photographic, or any other communicable form.245
Commentary
The purpose of Section 2 is to grant newsgatherers an absolute
privilege to resist compulsory disclosure of the identity of any and all
sources of information that wish for their identity to remain
confidential.246 The intention of Section 2 is to place the decision to
remain anonymous with the confidential source and bar a journalist
from being forced to divulge the source’s identity because of a subpoena
or court order.247 Thus, due to the potentially severe consequences that
await confidential sources, The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act allows a

245
The proposed model statute this Note contributes, both the text and commentary, is
the product of the author’s work and is not an adaptation of any one particular reporter’s
shield law, but is based on the complete range of the topics discussed and analyzed by this
Note. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-4703 (1992) (granting reporter’s an absolute privilege to
resist compulsory disclosure of the identity of a confidential source; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW
§ 79-H (same); IND. CODE § 34-46-4-2 (1998) (same).
246
See supra Part III.A; note 243 and accompanying text (noting the significance of
granting newsgatherer’s an absolute privilege to maintain the confidentiality of the identity
of sources).
247
See Campagnolo, supra note 1, at 451–53 (stressing the extreme significance in the
journalistic profession of protecting sources and information from discovery or revelation);
Dicke, supra note 41, at 1565 n.64 (explaining that journalists have a professional duty to
refrain from disclosing the identity of confidential sources and to do everything within
their power to protect a source of information from judicial or investigating bodies). See
also supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the significance that a source remain
confidential if he or she so desires as well as a journalist’s professional obligation to protect
his source’s decision to remain confidential and anonymous).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2009], Art. 6

232

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

confidential source to control his own fate by giving him the final
decision as to whether his identity will remain confidential.
C. The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act - Section 3: Qualified Privilege for
Information
Section 3 of this Act grants any organization or person falling
under Section 1 of this Act a qualified privilege to maintain
the confidentiality of news and information acquired from
sources. No organization or person falling under Section 1 of
this Act shall be compelled to disclose in any legal or
investigatory proceeding the substance of any news or
information, whether it goes published or unpublished, that is
obtained from or through the cooperation of a confidential or
non-confidential source, except as provided by subsections 1–3
of Section 3.
A movant may divest the qualified privilege granted to the
organization or person falling under Section 1 of this Act if
the movant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that:
1) the news, information, documents, or evidence the
newsgatherer has in his possession are relevant and
material to the movant’s case;
2) the news, information, documents, or evidence
cannot be obtained through any other means, and all
other sources of the news, information, documents, or
evidence have been exhausted; and
3) there exists a reasonable need for the news,
information, documents, or evidence.248
Commentary
Section 3 of The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act grants those
organizations and individuals falling under Section 1 of this Act a
qualified privilege to maintain the confidentiality of information gained
from sources whether that information or the source is confidential or
non-confidential. This Section allows a newsgatherer’s information,
248
The proposed model statute this Note contributes, both the text and commentary, is
the product of the author’s work and is not an adaptation of any one particular reporter’s
shield law, but is based on the complete range of the topics discussed and analyzed by this
Note. See supra text accompanying notes 91, 101 (stating that Florida’s qualified privilege
can be overcome if a movant meets the burden of proving through clear and specific
evidence or clear and convincing evidence that he has a compelling need for the
information); supra note 178 (discussing the reduced burden of proof required by Illinois’
reporter’s shield law).
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whether published or unpublished, to be vulnerable to compelled
disclosure.249 The rationale behind this provision is that it gives litigants
the opportunity to divest the qualified privilege, which is consistent with
the principles of equity and fairness that permeate the qualified
privilege.250 Hence, the litigants alone must satisfy the three conditions
enumerated under Section 3. Section 3’s qualified privilege presumes,
however, that the newsgatherer’s information and work product are
privileged until the conditions of Section 3 are met.251
Commentary on Section 3, Clause (1)
Clause 1 of Section 3 places the burden of proof on the movant and
requires that he or she prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
news, information, documents, or evidence in the newsgatherer’s
possession is relevant and material to the movant’s case or claim.252 The
goal of Clause 1 is to eliminate fishing expeditions by litigants, as well as
frivolous arguments or attempts to access news or information in a
newsgatherer’s possession.253
Commentary on Section 3, Clause (2)
Clause 2 of Section 3 requires the movant to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the news, information, documents, or evidence
that is being sought from the newsgatherer cannot be obtained from any
other source.254 In addition, Clause 2 requires the movant to prove by
249 See supra note 73 and accompanying (explaining that parties in civil proceedings
typically cannot divest a journalist’s protection from compulsory disclosure).
250
See supra Part III.B; note 238 and accompanying text (emphasizing that the significance
of the qualified privilege is that it allows litigants, government officials, and the judicial
system to have access, or at the very least the possibility of access, to as much information
as possible to be able to make not only informed decisions on legal issues, but to arrive at a
fair and equitable result for all parties concerned).
251
See, e.g., State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 227 (Fla. 1998) (finding that the Florida
reporter’s shield law gave journalists a qualified privilege that was going to apply to
protect a reporter’s confidential information unless a movant offered sufficient evidence
otherwise); Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 947–48 (Cal. 1990) (explaining that the
California shield law entitled a newsgatherer to immunity from compelled disclosure
unless the movant could show the reporter possessed exculpatory evidence).
252
See text accompanying notes 91, 101 (describing the burden of proof Florida
incorporates into its reporter’s shield law is a requirement that the movant introduce clear
and convincing evidence).
253
See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text (describing how a newsgatherer is
abused through the use of fishing expeditions conducted by litigants and law enforcement
agencies when he is left unprotected by inadequate shield laws or no shield law at all).
254
See text accompanying notes 91, 101 (describing the burden of proof Florida
incorporates into its reporter’s shield law is a requirement that the movant introduce clear
and convincing evidence).
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clear and convincing evidence that he has exhausted all other alternative
sources of information.255 The intent of this Section is to reduce frivolous
claims, arguments, and attempts to obtain a newsgatherer’s privileged
information.
Commentary on Section 3, Clause (3)
Clause 3 requires the movant to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he has only a reasonable need for the news, information,
documents, or evidence in the newsgatherer’s possession, as opposed to
proving a compelling or overriding need.256 The clause implements the
clear and convincing evidence burden of proof in order to allow litigants
to have a greater opportunity to access any and all discovery material
potentially relevant to his or her case or claim.257 To this end, Clause 3 of
Section 3 facilitates the ability of any party, regardless of the procedural
posture or setting of a case, to have an opportunity to access as much
evidence as possible, which promotes an equitable and judicious result.
V. CONCLUSION
As a whole, The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act illustrates the value
of the blended privilege: it is flexible, because it allows parties to access
information under particular conditions, but it remains concrete by
protecting confidential sources. The ongoing debate as to which
privilege to incorporate into reporter’s shield laws will continue as more
state legislatures, and perhaps even the federal government, grapple
with either implementing a reporter’s shield law or altering existing
shield laws. This Note and The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act it
contributes hope to offer guidance to legislative bodies that are
confronted with the challenges of implementing a reporter’s shield law.
The cost-benefit analysis conducted by this Note demonstrates that the
blended privilege is the most practical and effective privilege to
implement in a reporter’s shield law. The key facet of the blended
privilege that makes it preferable is its flexible rigidity; meaning, that the
blended privilege’s absolute protection for confidential sources and
balancing test for compulsory disclosure of information is an ideal
255
See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text (stressing the need for a qualified
privilege in order to facilitate the equitable administration of justice).
256
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907 (1985) (applying a more manageable burden of proof
that only requires the movant to demonstrate the information sought is unavailable from
other means, relevant to his claim, and not privileged information as a state secret, which
allows the shield law to play a greater role in both criminal and civil proceedings).
257
See text accompanying notes 91, 101 (discussing Florida’s requirement of only the
introduction of clear and convincing evidence).
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framework for a reporter’s shield law. Therefore, the blended privilege’s
breadth and clarity allow it to appeal to newsgatherers, litigants, law
enforcement, judges, confidential sources, and the public at large. As
this Note has shown, the best way for state legislatures to cash-in on
Branzburg’s “blank check” is to take advantage of the blended privilege.
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